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I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation against Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) is steadily
increasing,' and those who seek recovery for personal injuries negligently
inflicted by participating HMO physicians often seek recovery from the HMO
as well the physician.2 When seeking recovery from the HMO under the
doctrine of vicarious liability and utilizing the agency principles of either
respondeat superior or ostensible or apparent agency, the decisive factors are
control, supervision, and implied representations. 3  One critical factor in
determining whether the HMO exercised sufficient control in order to impose
vicarious liability is the structure of the HMO, whether it is a Staff, Group,
Network, or IPA Model HMO.' Moreover, a few recent decisions5 suggest
1. See generally Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability
in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285 (1995); Gregory G. Binford,
Malpractice and the Prepaid Health Care Organization, 3 WHIrTIER L. REv. 338 (1981); William
A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26
TORT & INS. L.J. 451 (1991); Mark G. Cooper, A "New" Approach to Medical Malpractice: The
Liability of HMOs for Member Physician Negligence, 1994 DEr. C. L. REV. 1263; Robert N.
Meyer, Group Prepaid Health Plan Liability When a Physician Provider Malpractices, 6 N. MEX.
L. REV. 79 (1975); Richard C. Reuben, In Pursuit of Health: With More Patients Suing HMOs for
Denial of Treatment Lawyers Are Exploring New Ground in Going up Against the Managed-Care
Giant, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 54.
2. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Chaghervand v.
Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995); Rice v. Panchal, 875 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ill. 1994);
Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. 111. 1994); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865
F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Patemno v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Butler
v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993); Raglin v. HMO Illinois,
Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (I1. App. Ct. 1992); Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995); McClellan
v. Health Maintenance Org., 660 A.2d 97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med.
Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
3. See, e.g., Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Chase v.
Independent Prac. Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med,
Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
4. See generally Cooper, supra note 1; Michael Kanute, Evolving Theories of Malpractice
Liability of HMOs, 20 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 841 (1989).
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that litigants may successfully argue corporate negligence in order to establish
negligence in utilization review or when cost-containment efforts, especially
those that provide financial incentives not to order diagnostic tests,
hospitalization, or refer to specialists, are a substantial factor in the physician's
negligent treatment.
This Article will discuss the various models of HMOs and potential theories
of tort liability that may apply to each. This Article will also discuss the major
barrier to HMO litigation for recovery of damages for personal injuries, namely,
ERISA preemption.6 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)7 to provide a uniform body of law regarding the
administration of employee benefit plans and curtail abuses in the administration
of those plans.8 Because most HMOs are part of employee benefit plans, they
are subject to ERISA.9 However, while ERISA preempts conflicting state laws
that "relate to" employee benefit plans,'0 courts are divided as to whether state
5. See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990);
Wickline v. State of California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Pulvers v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, Inc., 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Bush v. Dake, File No. 86-25767 NM-
2 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Saginaw County 1989); Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995); McClellan
v. Health Maintenance Org., 660 A.2d 97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
6. See generally Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619
(1994); Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Patrick D. Seiter, Health Plan Liability in the Age of Managed
Care, 62 DEF. CouNs. J. 191 (1995); Jim M. Perdue & Stephen R. Baxley, Cutting Costs-Cutting
Care: Can Texas Managed Health Care Systems and HMOs Be Liable for the Medical Malpractice
of Physicians?, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 23 (1995).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
8. Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication
of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REv. 355, 358-60 (1994).
9. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 309 (1995) [hereinafter FURROW Er AL., HEALTH
LAW].
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
MacDougall: The "Shared Risk" of Potential Tort Liability of Health Maintenan
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998
858 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
tort causes of action against HMOs "relate to" the benefit plans and are
accordingly preempted by ERISA. " In many jurisdictions, ERISA is the major
roadblock to tort causes of actions against HMOs.
II. THE PROS AND CONS OF HMOs
While HMOs emerged in the United States in the 1930s, 2 they did not
provide health care coverage to a significant portion of the American population
11. For cases holding that ERISA does not preempt vicarious liability claims against HMOs,
see Prudential Health Care Plan v. Lewis, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d
637 (7th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995); Prihoda v.
Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995);
Kusznir v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., No. 95-C-1325, 1995 WL 404860 (N.D. 11. May 31, 1995);
Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. I11. 1994); Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp.
1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ill. 1994);
Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555
A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). For cases holding that ERISA preempts causes of action founded
on direct corporate liability, but not those founded on vicarious liability, see Pacificare of Oklahoma,
Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D.
Md. 1995); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865
F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa.
1994); Burke v. Smithkline Bio-Science Lab., 858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Elsesser v.
Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
Stroker v. Rubin, No. Civ.A. 94-5563, 1994 WL 719694 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22,.1994). For cases
holding that ERISA preemption applies to claims based upon the corporate negligence of HMOs
without addressing vicarious liability claims, see Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d
1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Spain v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City,
Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1992). For cases holding that ERISA preempts claims alleging the vicarious liability of HMOs, see
Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1994); Visconti v. U.S.
Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994);
Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys. of Pa., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Nealy v.
U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316
(D.N.J. 1993). For a case holding that ERISA does not preempt a cause of action alleging the
liability of an HMO on a theory of direct corporate liability, see Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996).
12. Tayebe Shah-Mirany, Malpractice Liability ofHealth Maintenance Organizations: Evolving
Contract and Tort Theories, 39 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 357 (1993). Prepaid medical plans have
existed since the nineteenth century; however, they were usually organized around a small group of
people for common ethnic, religious, or employment reasons and were unknown to the general
public. A national health committee introduced HMOs in 1932 to provide affordable health care
during the Depression. Randolph E. Sarnacki, Comment, Contractual Theories of Recovery in the
HMO Provider-Subscriber Relationship: Prospective Litigation for Breach of Contract, 36 BUFF.
L. REV. 119, 120 n.3 (1987). Moreover, the Kaiser plans began in the West in the 1930s. Paul
M. Ellwood, Jr. & George D. Lundberg, Managed Care-A Work in Progress, 276 JAMA 1083,
1083 (1996).
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until the 1980s.' 3 The recent popularity and growth 4 of HMOs has occurred
because the structure of HMOs creates a unique cost-savings system that, as the
proponents contend, allows better health care coverage than traditional fee-for-
service plans.
Traditionally, medical services were provided on a fee-for-service basis,
meaning that physicians received renumeration only for services provided,
thereby creating a potential financial incentive to provide unnecessary tests,
procedures, and treatments. Critics of the fee-for-service approach have argued
that this approach treats diseases rather than preventing them. President Richard
M. Nixon noted the irony that the emphasis on treatment through the traditional
fee-for-service approach meant that health care providers would make more
money as the number of ill people and the resulting services, treatment, and
laboratory tests increased.'" Concerns over the rising costs of medicine and
the provision of medical services to larger segments of the population led
President Nixon to endorse HMOs in 1971.6 In 1973, federal legislation was
enacted to spur the growth of HMOs, and today most states have HMO enabling
acts. "7
13. FURROW E" AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, § 8-1. Today, many perceive HMOs as a
partial solution to the problem of providing health care coverage to larger and poorer segments of
the American population. See generally Rand E. Rosenblatt, Equality, Entitlement, and National
Health Care Reform: The Challenge of Managed Competition and Managed Care, 60 BROOK. L.
REV. 105 (1994); Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a Social Arena: Strategies for
Action, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 275 (1994).
14. In 1980, only 5 to 10% of Americans with health insurance sponsored through employment
were enrolled in managed care plans; by 1987, the number had risen to 60%. "By 1992 HMO
enrollment had exceeded 40 million members, with 16% of the U.S. population enrolled in an
HMO." FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, § 8-1. A study of six large HMOs in
California found that the number of HMO enrollees whose care was financed through capitation
payments increased by 91% from 1990 to 1994. Four of the six HMOs were at one time owned by
member physicians. James C. Robinson & Lawrence P. Casalino, The Growth of Medical Groups
Paid Through Capitation in California, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1684 (1995).
15. Sarnacki, supra note 12, at 1.19.
16. Id. at 120. President Nixon did not propose that an independent commission be formed to
make HMOs accountable for the impact of managed care on their enrollees' health. Ellwood &
Lundberg, supra note 12, at 1083. In 1979, managed-care trade associations formed the National
Committee for Quality Assurance. However, the National Committee for Quality Assurance did not
gain independence from the trade associations until 1990 when it finally became enabled to conduct
an independent quality-review system. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report-The National
Committee for Quality Assurance, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 995 (1996).
17. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, § 8-1.
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Proponents of the HMO approach argue that the traditional fee-for-service
approach provides little financial incentive to weigh costs in evaluating the need
for additional services in order to reduce potential medical problems. 18 Many
medical risks are very unlikely to occur, or they might not cause significant
harm to a patient or might not be treatable. Furthermore, treatment itself might
create new risks. 9 It is also argued that organizations built on the fee-for-
service approach rarely compare the cost versus the benefit of the wide range
of health services available.2" Proponents contend that the HMO "is especially
well suited to weigh all relevant factors in deciding how, and how much, to
reduce the medical risks faced by its enrollee-patients. "21
HMOs are unique in that they provide comprehensive health care services
for a fixed prepaid fee, called a capitation payment.22 Advocates contend that
HMOs are "motivated to scrutinize the effectiveness of every risk-reducing
measure they take, "23 "weigh the medical effectiveness and value of their
expenditures and . . . curb ...superfluous ...tests" 24 because HMOs must
provide comprehensive care from the limited pool of money provided by the
capitation payments. Thus, HMOs concentrate on preventive medicine and
treating illnesses before they become acute in order to avoid depleting the fixed
budget.2 It is argued that the end result should be better health care at lower
costs. Generally, HMOs do cost less, admit fewer patients to hospitals, and use
fewer hospital days than fee-for-service plans.26
18. Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary
Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1377.
19. Id. at 1376.
20. Id. at 1377.
21. Id. at 1376. See also Bruce D. Platt & Lisa D. Stream, Dispelling the Negative Myths of
Managed Care: An Analysis of Anti-Managed Care Legislation and the Quality of Care Provided
by Health Maintenance Organizations, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 489 (1995).
22. Samacki, supra note 12, at 122. Capitation payments can either underpay or overpay
physicians depending on the patient's health. Jinnet B. Fowles et. al, Taking Health Status into
Account When Setting Capitation Rates, 276 JAMA 1316 (1996). Between 1987 and 1995, the
number of Medicare patients whose health care was paid using capitation tripled. Donald M.
Berwick, Quality of Health Care-Payment by Capitation and the Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1227 (1996).
23. Bovbjerg, supra note 18, at 1376.
24. Id. at 1379.
25. Id.
26. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, § 8-1. HMOs cost 10-40% less, admit
patients to the hospital 40% less, and use 40% fewer hospital days. Id. A study of California
HMOs found that the number of hospital days per 1000 enrollees was substantially less than the
national average and the rates of visits per enrollee to physicians were lower. Robinson & Casalino,
supra note 14, at 1687. "HMO enrollees receive more preventive care than enrollees in traditional
health insurance plans. Moreover, . . . studies generally show that HMO patients receive care of
the same or better quality than other patients." Maxwell J. Mehlman, Medical Advocates: A Call
for a New Profession, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 299, 301 (1996). See also Philip R. Alper, Learning
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Critics of the HMO approach contend that the capitation system and
"shared risk pool" create incentives not to treat patients or not to order
expensive medical tests or procedures. Patients enrolled in HMOs must select
a primary care doctor, called a "gatekeeper," from a list of participating
physicians. Each physician receives the same monthly per capita payment for
each patient whether the physician sees the individual patient many times or not
at all. Usually the physician does not receive the entire capitation; rather, he
or she will receive only a portion, and the remainder will be placed in a shared
risk pool. At the end of the year, all participating primary care physicians will
share out of the shared risk pool whatever money is not spent on health care.
The shared risk pool decreases if tests or consultations are ordered.27 One
critic has argued, "The physician, therefore, is given financial incentives not to
do his or her best and is no longer the advocate of the patient, but may become
to Accentuate the Positive in Managed Care, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 508 (1997). Some categories
of enrolled patients might feel they are receiving better care in an HMO as compared with a fee-for-
service plan. Paul J. Schilling has noted:
One clear improvement in some of the managed care Medicaid programs is that they do
designate a physician and hospital for the patients to have access to care. This is a clear
departure from Medicaid non-managed care programs where patients are left to "shop"
for a physician who will take Medicaid. By virtue of the fact that they do have an
identifiable physician, patients may feel that they are more satisfied with their care, even
if they haven't yet received care.
Paul J. Schilling, Patient Satisfaction with MedicaidManaged Care, 272 JAMA 1297, 1297 (1996).
27. Ronald Bronow, HMO Physicians' Shared Risk Pools Are Dangerous to Patients' Health,
HEALTHSPAN, Jan. 1993, at 9. One author suggests three reasons why patients, at times, receive
sub-standard care from HMOs and that the dynamic of these three factors create a need for consumer
protection. Marc A Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What Are the Issues?, 26
SETON HALL L. REV. 1007, 1011-14 (1996). First, financial incentives, including capitation and
shared risk pools, give physicians an "incentive to make frugal use of diagnostic tests, referrals, and
hospitalization. Physician risk-sharing can bias physician judgment and lead doctors to deny
appropriate services." Id. at 1012. The second reason is that HMOs are "complex organizations"
and are "vulnerable to organizational pathologies .... [L]arge organizations can impede change,
become unresponsive, and limit the appropriate use of discretion by professionals. They can diffuse
authority and diminish personal responsibility, thereby reducing accountability." Id. at 1013. The
third factor is that HMOs "restrict choice: an escape valve for consumers if doctors or MCOs
[managed care organizations] perform poorly." Id. In other words, a fee-for-service patient could
seek care elsewhere once poor treatment occurs. Choices for a patient enrolled in an HMO would
be limited to those provided within the internal structure of the organization; a patient could only
see doctors within the same network, utilization review could block expensive services, and
consultations with specialists would be subject to the approval of the primary care specialists who,
at the same time, typically has a financial incentive to limit referrals. The combination of these
three factors "explain why consumers sometimes receive shoddy treatment from MCOs and
demonstrate the need for consumer protection." Id. at 1014. Furthermore, no evidence suggests
that a plan's clinical performance affects the economic success of managed care plans in today's
market, nor will it affect the economic success in the future. "[P]urchasers and consumers have not,
so far, rewarded or punished plans based on quality" of care provided. Ellwood & Lundberg, supra
note 12, at 1085.
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the patient's adversary."2" He added that "when financial incentives are
provided to physicians to limit costs, the interests of patients and physicians
become diametrically opposed. The more the physician attempts to help the
patient, the less the physician is compensated."29
Advocates of the traditional fee-for-service plans contend that HMOs had
no significant impact on the cost of medicine in the 1980s and are not expected
to reduce health care costs in the 1990s.' Furthermore, they argue that
patients enrolled in HMOs may visit their doctors less, may be admitted to the
28. Bronow, supra note 27, at 9. See also Mehiman, supra note 26 (contending that the
presence of HMOs necessitates the existence of a health care advocate to protect the patient's
interests). Mehlman argues that developments in managed care
submerge the interests of individual patients and ... subordinate them to the interests
of the group, whether it be a group of managers, insureds, or shareholders. Patients
face increasingly large and powerful provider/payer bureaucracies. These organizations
are motivated by competitive pressures to earn profits by reducing costs. If necessary,
they withhold beneficial services, particularly from patients who are seriously or
chronically ill. These individuals are lost in a system of quality measurement
approaches that focus on the experiences of large numbers of persons.
Id. at 303. The traditional ally of the patient, who would work to assure proper care and work
exclusively to protect the patient's best interest, was the physician. Id. at 314. However, managed
care forces physicians to develop alliances with third-party payers instead of patients. "The financial
incentives and other pressures under managed care place physicians in a conflict of interest between
their duties to their patients and their own self-interest." Id. at 315. "If individual patients face an
increasingly adversarial health care system, yet there is no one willing or able to serve as their allies,
then a new profession of patient representatives is needed"-the "Medical Advocate." Id. at 320.
29. Bronow, supra note 27, at 11. See also David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More To Do
Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996). Interestingly, reported
decisions involving coverage disputes between HMOs and enrolled patients are scarce. It has been
argued:
Managed care settings such as HMOs are less likely to produce coverage disputes, even
though they are more likely to deny treatment, because coverage decisions are frequently
made by treating physicians or by a medical director in the physician's practice group.
Indemnity insurance requires a third-party medical director with the insurance company
to overrule the treating physician's recommendation. HMOs and other forms of
managed care, in contrast, use corporate and financial incentives to motivate physicians
not to make treatment recommendations in the first place. This absence of patient
knowledge that potentially beneficial care is being foregone could easily account for the
lack of coverage disputes arising from managed care settings,
Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of
Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055, 1060-61 (1996). The lack of judicial
decisions could also be partly explained by the presence of arbitration clauses in many policies
providing HMO coverage. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Resolving Consumer Grievances in
a Managed Care Environment, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 147 (1996).
30. Bronow, supra note 27, at 12 (referring to a Congressional Budget Office report). Others
contend that managed care has created a more competitive market and has reduced the rate of
increase in health care costs. David F. Drake, Managed Care: A Product of Market Dynamics, 277
JAMA 560 (1997).
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hospital fewer times, and may spend fewer days in the hospital because HMOs
provide their services to a healthier group of patients."
Critics of HMOs perceive that the primary care doctors, as "gatekeepers,"
restrict patient access to specialists based on an erroneous philosophy that
specialists are too expensive and order unnecessary tests. However, the lack of
referral to specialists might cause several results: increased medical costs due
to improper diagnosis and delayed treatment, additional visits to the primary
care provider, potentially inappropriate treatment and improper diagnosis at the
hands of the "gatekeeper," dangers to the patient's health and increased costs
due to delayed treatment, and additional, more expensive medications and tests
when specialized treatment is finally received. 2
The evidence is unclear whether the HMO approach will help curtail the
rising cost of medicine while at the same time providing quality health care.
However, one certainty is that the structure of the HMO makes it a prime target
for civil tort litigation when an enrolled patient is injured through the
malpractice of a physician receiving the financial rewards from the HMO
capitation and shared risk pool systems. While the precise structure of HMOs
vary, the HMO's structure in relationship to the participating physicians will be
the key factor in determining the potential theory of recovery in tort law.
31. Robinson & Casalino, supra note 14, at 1687 (stating the "possibility that the lower rates
of hospital utilization and visits to physicians reflect the provision of services to relatively healthy
groups of patients"). Studies comparing the quality of care provided under managed care and under
traditional fee-for-service plans are based on "aggregated data from a large number of
patients. ... Individual patients may still suffer from poor quality care." Mehlman, supra note
26, at 301 n.7 (citations omitted). Some believe that competitive pressures will force HMOs to
withhold treatments with established benefits to patients in order to save money. Maxwell J.
Mehlman has argued:
Moreover, it is important to note that the incentive to provide preventive services
disappears once prevention has failed and the enrollee becomes ill. Even if managed
care providers are willing to make short-term expenditures to reduce long-term costs,
they still have an incentive to withhold services from enrollees who become chronically
or seriously ill and require extensive, costly care.
Id. at 302. However, very little objective evidence demonstrates an overall decline in the quality
of care in managed care systems. See Ellwood & Lundberg, supra note 12, at 1085. See generally
ABA HEALTH LAW SEcTION, ACHIEVING QUALITY IN MANAGED CARE: THE ROLE OF LAW (John
D. Blum ed., 1997).
32. Bronow, supra note 27, at 11. One study explored the ability of primary care physicians
to diagnosis correctly the most encountered skin conditions seen by dermatologists. Primary care
physicians correctly diagnosed the patient's problem in only 54% of the cases. Dermatologists
correctly diagnosed the patients condition in over 90% of the cases. Id.
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III. TYPICAL HMO PHYSICIAN CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
All HMOs share certain common attributes:
An HMO is defined as an alternative system of health care
delivery, whereby health care providers enter into contracts with
or are employed by a health care entity to provide comprehensive
health care to voluntarily enrolled patients. The most distinguishing
characteristic of membership in an HMO is that an enrolled patient
pays a prepaid, fixed fee for medical services .... [T]he patient pays
a one-time charge for subsequent complete health care services. The
prepaid fee is paid without regard to the actual amount of services
provided to the enrolled patients."
The four basic models of HMOs are: (1) the Staff Model HMO; (2) the Group
Model HMO; (3) the Network Model HMO; and (4) the IPA Model HMO.'
The nature of the contractual relationship maintained between the administrative
corporate structure of the HMO and the participating physicians distinguishes
these four different models.' While these HMO models illustrate the typical
arrangements, many HMOs do not fit neatly into one specific category because
they may combine features from two or more models. 36 Much of the potential
33. Kanute, supra note 4, at 841-42. See also Earlene P. Weiner, Note, ManagedHealth Care:
HMO Corporate Liability, Independent Contractors, and the Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 15 J.
CORP. L. 535, 541 (1990) (stating that "'[tihe essential elements of the HMO concept are (a)
provision of comprehensive medical services-including as a minimum, basic physician care,
hospital care, and emergency care; (b) to a defined enrolled population; (c) on a prepayment rather
than a fee-for-service basis.'") (quoting S. REP. No. 129, 93d Cong. 141, reprinted in 1973 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3033, 3117).
34. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 478-79. Regarding the definition of
HMO, see Walsh v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 376 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979); Huff v. St.
Joseph's Mercy Hosp. of Dubuque Corp., 261 N.W.2d 695 (Iowa 1978). See also McClellan v.
Health Maint. Org., 660 A.2d 97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In McClellan, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania discusses the various forms of HMOs. The type of HMO can determine legal issues
other than potential legal liability for negligent care. In McClellan, the issue was whether the HMO
could claim protection under the Pennsylvania peer review immunity statute. The court concluded
that the HMO could not claim the protection or confidentiality of the peer review statute because it
was an IPA Model HMO. The court stated that "lilt is this court's opinion that entities such as Staff
or Group Model HMOs may be considered 'health care providers' . . . in an appropriate case. Not
so clear, however, is whether IPA Model HMOs, like HMO of Pa., that do not operate their own
facilities, but merely act as insurers or quasi-insurers, should be covered." Id. at 101-02.
35. Kanute, supra note 4, at 842.
36. Id. It has been noted that "[m]anaged-care plans, particularly HMOs, have complex
systems for selecting, paying, and monitoring their physicians. Hybrid forms are common, and the
differences between group or staff HMOs and network or IPA HMOs are less extensive than is
commonly assumed." Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care
Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1678 (1995). This survey lumps Staff
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liability of the HMO will hinge on the amount of control the HMO exercises
over individual physicians in the treatment of patients, and the contractual
provisions of the HMO Model will usually dictate the degree of control.
A. Staff Model HMOs
A Staff Model HMO will usually own or lease and operate its own primary
care medical facility.3" The Staff HMO will typically employ its own
physicians as "staff," and the physicians will receive salaries directly from the
HMO.3" Typically, the physicians will treat only HMO enrolled patients and
will not treat patients outside the HMO on a fee-for-service basis.39 In many
Staff Model HMOs, the individual physicians will receive a given salary plus
incentive bonuses paid out of the "shared risk pool" based on the HMO's
profitability .'o
B. Group Model HMOs
Medical Group HMOs, the second most prevalent form,41 contract with
or employ a medical group of physicians, rather than individual physicians, to
and Group Model HMOs together and Network and IPA Model HMOs together in compiling
statistics. In 92% of Network or IPA Model HMOs and in 61% of Group or Staff HMOs, patients
must select a primary care physician who is responsible for specialist referrals. Id. at 1682.
Network or IPA Model HMOs use capitation to pay primary care physicians 56 % of the time; while
Staff or Group HMOs do so 34% of the time. Id. at 1681. A fixed salary, with adjusted payments
to create incentives, for primary care physicians is common in Staff or Group Model HMOs. Id.
In contrast, only 20 percent of the network or IPA HMOs used capitation as a
predominant method of payment for individual specialists; 54 percent had some form
of risk sharing with specialists, 47 percent used capitated payment for certain specialties,
and 33 percent used competitive bidding to obtain some specialty services. The
specialties in which physicians were most commonly paid on a capitated basis were
cardiology, mental health, radiology, orthopedics, and ophthalmology.
Id. at 1680. Fewer than half of the Staff or Group HMOs paid specialists using capitation. All
forms of HMOs commonly employed risk-sharing with physicians, adjusted payments to the
.gatekeeper" to create performance-based incentives, and required physicians to care for only plan
members or for a predetermined number of patients within the plan. "Fifty percent of the group or
staff HMOs and 74 percent of the network or IPA HMOs adjusted payments according to utilization
and cost patterns." Id. This national survey of HMOs suggested "that many of the differences
between specific HMOs cannot be explained by their classification as group or staff HMOs or as
network or IPA HMOs." Id. at 1682. The Congressional Budget Office's assumption that most of
the cost savings result from Group or Staff Model HMOs, rather than Network or IPA Model
HMOs, might not be correct. Id.
37. Cooper, supra note 1, at 1264.
38. 0. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance Organizations: Evolving
Theories and ERISA's Impact. 19 NOVA L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995).
39. Weiner, supra note 33, at 540.
40. Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 27.
41. Kanute, supra note 4, at 843.
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provide care to their enrollees 2 Because the contract is with a single medical
group, patients enrolled in this type of HMO will usually have limited choices
regarding doctors."3 The treatment is typically provided at an HMO owned or
operated facility.' The physicians are compensated through capitation
payments;45 however, the doctors will usually provide services to fee-for-
service patients and are simply adding a pre-paid component to their
practices.46
C. Network Model HMOs
A Network Model HMO is similar to a Group Model HMO; however, the
Network Model HMO contracts with multiple medical groups and/or individual
physicians to provide care to enrolled patients rather than a single medical group
as in the Group Model HMO. 7 Individual medical groups may also contract
with other HMOs. The care is typically provided in the participating physician's
facility; thus, the physician utilizes neither the equipment nor the physical plant
owned or operated by the HMO. While the physician is compensated through
capitation payments,4 the individual physician will usually provide care to
unenrolled patients and thus will also be compensated through a fee-for-service
trade. 9
D. IPA Model HMOs
The Independent Practice Association or Indorsement Practice Association
(IPA) Model HMO is the most prevalent with approximately fifty percent of all
HMOs falling into this category.5" The IPA Model differs dramatically from
the other models in that no direct contractual relationship is created between the
HMO and the individual physicians. Instead, the privity exists between the
HMO and the IPA: the HMO contracts with the IPA, and the IPA then
contracts with individual physicians to provide care to HMO enrollees at the
physician's office." Each physician will utilize his or her own office,
equipment, and records, rather than the HMO's. 2
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 28.
45. Weiner, supra note 33, at 540.
46. Kanute, supra note 4, at 843.
47. Weiner, supra note 33, at 541.
48. Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 28.
49. Weiner, supra note 33, at 541.
50. Id. See also FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 479 (noting that "[a] recent
study of HMOs found that 48 % were IPAs, 14% networks,'and 38% staff or group-model HMOs").
51. Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 28.
52. Kanute, supra note 4, at 844.
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Hence, the IPA model HMO combines, in a single program, features
of the staff and group model HMOs. An IPA model HMO provides
the comprehensive benefit package of a staff model HMO and care in
the office of one of a group of privately practicing physicians who is
not directly employed by the HMO's administrative body. 3
In the IPA Model HMO, the IPA receives the capitation payment, not the
individual physician. The IPA will then compensate the physician on a fee-for-
service basis. 4 Typically, the IPA will withhold a fixed percentage of each
payment from the physician, and "[t]he amount withheld may equal twenty to
thirty percent of the potential fee, which the physician can recover only by
achieving preset cost-containment goals.""5 Because IPA HMOs employ the
shared risk pool in combination with utilization review, they can be subject to
potential tort liability along with Staff, Group, and Network Model HMOs.
IV. THE POTENTIAL THEORIES OF TORTIOUS LIABILITY AGAINST HMOS
Arguably, cost-containment procedures which include capitation, shared risk
pools, and utilization review create disincentives to providing to HMO enrollees
appropriate treatment and referral to specialists. Cost-containment efforts also
increase HMO control over individual physicians in treatment decisions, and
physicians view them as an "usurpation of their judgment and independence. "56
Furthermore, "[t]he more HMOs exercise control over their participating
physicians, the more their exposure to liability for the torts of the doctors will
continue to increase. 7
Various legal theories may be used to impose liability for medical
negligence upon HMOs: vicarious liability based upon respondeat superior or
ostensible or apparent agency, and corporate negligence or direct liability.5"
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 28.
56. Reuben, supra note 1, at 56.
57. Id.
58. See generally Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 1; Gregory G. Binford, Malpractice and the
Prepaid Health Care Organization, 3 WHrITER L. REV. 337 (1981); William F. Brossman, Jr. &
William M. Mercer, Legal Liability Issues in Managed Care, C653 ALI-ABA 471 (1991); William
A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26
TORT & INS. L.J. 451 (1991); Conrad & Seiter, supra note 6; Cooper, supra note 1; William J.
Curran & George B. Moseley Im, The Malpractice Experience of Health Maintenance Organizations,
70 Nw. U. L. REV. 69 (1975); Michael A. Dowell, Avoiding HMO Liability for Utilization Review,
23 U. TOL. L. REV. 117 (1991); Kanute, supra note 4; Robert N. Meyer, Group Prepaid Health
Plan Liability When a Physician Provider Malpractices, 6 N.M. L. REv. 79 (1975); Perdue &
Baxley, supra note 6; Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk
Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND
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These theories have been used in analogous cases to impose liability upon
hospitals. Furthermore, the amount of HMO control over the treatment of
individual patients injured by the alleged negligence of participating physicians
provides the basis for each theory of liability. Of course, physicians remain
personally liable for any patient injuries caused by their negligence. The crucial
question becomes whether HMOs should be liable, or should share in the
liability, when the medical negligence alleged involves the cost-saving structure
of HMOs, e.g., where the injuries result from failures to refer, order diagnostic
tests, aggressively treat, or hospitalize patients. Thus, the issue is essentially
who should bear the burden of paying judgments rendered for negligent medical
care, especially when cost-containment efforts are a substantial factor in causing
the sub-standard care. Should the individual physician who delivered the
negligent care, the HMO who controlled the manner of treatment through
planned financial incentives, or both the HMO and the treating physician be
liable for the patient's injuries?
Quite clearly, the transition from the fee-for-service system to one based
on capitation exposes new defendants to medical negligence litigation, i.e., the
HMO. Richard C. Reuben has noted:
In the erstwhile fee-for-service era, lawsuits were relatively
straightforward: The doctor performed the services and was the
primary target for litigation when something went wrong. But
managed care has changed that dynamic dramatically, and is beginning




Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, employers are vicariously liable
for torts committed by their employees when the wrongful conduct of the
employees occurred during the course of and within the scope of
employment. 6° The determinative factor in imposing such vicarious liability
L. REV. 1 (1994); Shah-Mirany, supra note 12; Weiner, supra note 33; Zamora, supra note 38.
On the potential liability of an HMO for breach of contract, see Sarnacki, supra note 12.
59. Reuben, supra note 1, at 56.
60. See Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (I11. App. Ct. 1992). Commentators
have noted:
The doctrine of respondeat superior is based on the premise that when an innocent party
is injured through tortious conduct committed in the furtherance of a business enterprise,
the enterprise should bear the loss as a legitimate business expense. Under this
doctrine, courts deliberately place the risk of loss upon the business entity because it can
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is the right of employers to control the activities of their agents. Courts use
numerous factors to determine whether a master-servant relationship existed:
[Tihe right of the employer to control the details of the work done by
the employee, the method of payment, the skill required in the
particular occupation, whether the employer supplies the tools,
instrumentalities and place of work, as well as the parties' own belief
as to whether they are creating a master-servant relationship.61
Traditionally, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not hold hospitals
liable for the negligent conduct of physicians practicing within the hospital.
Originally, physicians who were employed by hospitals or who held staff
privileges at hospitals were considered independent contractors because they
exercised their own professional judgment, skill, and expertise in treating
patients, and hospitals lacked sufficient control over the manner and details of
their work.62 However, by 1957, this rule was rejected as to physician-
employees so that hospitals could be vicariously liable like any other employer.
One court has pronounced:
Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibility borne by
everyone else. There is no reason to continue their exemption from
the universal rule of respondeat superior. The test should be, for
these institutions, . . as it is for every other employer, was the
person who committed the negligent injury-producing act one of its
employees and, if he was, was he acting within the scope of his
employment. 63
Inasmuch as these principles of liability apply to hospitals, they will generally
apply to HMOs as well, and thus HMOs can also be vicariously liable for the
negligence of physicians so long as the physicians are considered employees.'
As one court has argued, "the test of vicarious liability is still one of control or
better absorb the loss and shift the cost to society as a whole.
Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 29.
61. Chase v. Independent Prac. Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251, 253 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
62. See Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); Kanute, supra
note 4, at 847.
63. Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957). The Bing decision only applied to
physicians who were actually employed by the hospital. Physicians holding staff privileges are still
considered independent contractors, and hospitals cannot be vicariously liable for the torts of staff
physicians unless other legal theories support such liability, such as ostensible or apparent agency
or the independent negligence of hospitals in failing properly to monitor staff physicians or failing
to use reasonable care in selecting or retaining their staff.
64. See Chase v. Independent Prac. Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
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right of control by the employer (i.e., hospital or HMO) over the actual conduct
by the physician (employee) alleged to be negligent."'
Most of the cases brought against HMOs seek to impose vicarious
liability," which has been described as the "bedrock" of HMO litigation.67
In Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc.,' one of the first
cases deciding whether HMOs could be vicariously liable for the medical
malpractice of their physicians, the court held that "where the usual requisites
of agency or an employer-employee relationship exist, a corporation may be held
vicariously liable for malpractice for the acts of its employee-physicians." 69
Litigants will find it easier to establish the requisite master-servant relationship
and sufficient control by the HMO over the physician in the Staff Model HMO
context, and thus justify vicarious liability, because these HMOs directly employ
physicians, the physicians are paid fixed salaries, the physicians deliver care
only to HMO enrolled patients, and the physicians utilize HMO facilities and
equipment. 70 In contrast, litigants will find it difficult to establish the requisite
65. Id. at 254.
66. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1270. See, e.g., Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of
Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (imposing vicarious liability because
physician could not act independently of the HMO's physician); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,
875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (imposing vicarious liability upon HMO when a physician-
employee provided negligent treatment); Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 160 Cal. Rptr.
392 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the evidence supported imposing vicarious liability); Raglin v. HMO
Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (refusing to impose vicarious liability on an IPA
Model HMO due to lack of control); Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc.,
516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (imposing vicarious liability because the physician was an
employee of the HMO); Gugino v. Harvard Community Health Plan, 403 N.E.2d 1166 (Mass.
1980) (imposing vicarious liability on a Staff Model HMO); Chase v. Independent Prac. Ass'n, Inc.,
583 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that an IPA Model HMO was not vicariously liable
because it lacked sufficient control over individual physicians); Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding HMO vicariously liable when physicians "were not free
to accept or reject particular patients" and were paid by capitation); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d
147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding sufficient allegations of an agency relationship were made to
impose vicarious liability upon an HMO); Williams v. Health America Corp. of Tx., 743 S.W.2d
373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to impose vicarious liability on an HMO because the corporation
could not practice medicine under Texas law and denying summary judgment because no control was
shown).
67. Zamora, supra note 38, at 1049.
68. 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
69. Id. at 1109. In Sloan, one of the critical factors that established control was the fact that
the physician was supervised by and under the control of a medical director, who was also a
physician, and "who policed medical services and established policy. His judgment was final. The
circumstances establish an employment relationship where the employee performed acts within the
scope of his employment." Id.
70. See, e.g., Gugino v. Harvard Community Health Plan, 403 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (Mass.
1980) (holding an HMO could be vicariously liable for its employee-physician's negligence if a
"factual basis [existed] for inferring that the Plan had power of control or direction over the conduct
in question.") See also Kanute, supra note 4, at 864.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 [1998], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss3/3
1998] "SHARED RISK" OF POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY 871
employer-employee relationship between HMOs and participating physicians in
the IPA Model HMO context because no contractual relationships are created
between the HMOs and physicians (HMOs contract with IPAs who then contract
with physicians), physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis, physicians
provide care in their own private offices and with their own equipment, and
physicians treat both enrolled and non-enrolled patients. 7
Group and Network Model HMOs are more difficult. The physicians
participating in Group and Network Model HMOs are paid by capitation, but the
physicians may or may not use HMO owned or operated facilities and
equipment, the physicians may or may not treat unenrolled patients on a fee-for-
service basis, and the manner and details of the work of physicians may or may
not be supervised through utilization review. However, Group and Network
Model HMOs could be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior if a court finds that an HMO exercised sufficient control and that a
master-servant relationship existed between the HMO and the physician.' To
determine whether an HMO exerted sufficient control over the treating physician
and whether a master-servant relationship existed so as to justify imposing
vicarious liability, courts will consider the following factors: (1) whether the
method of payment is fee-for-service or capitation; (2) whether complaints
regarding service are made to the physician or the HMO; (3) whether the
physician is salaried or has a benefit package; (4) whether the physician treats
any unenrolled patients; (5) whether enrollment is made through the HMO or
the physician; (6) whether the HMO or the physician bills the patient for
services rendered;7 3 (7) whether the HMO's or the physician's facilities and
equipment is used in the treatment of patients; (8) whether the HMO retains
power to coordinate or assign the scheduling of physicians;74 (9) whether care
rendered by a physician is subject to the control or review of a medical director
or supervising physician;75 and (10) whether the physician has the power to
accept or reject a particular patient. 76
71. See, e.g., Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that
there was not sufficient evidence of control to impose vicarious liability upon an IPA Model HMO
for the medical negligence of a participating physician); Chase v. Independent Prac. Ass'n, Inc., 583
N.E.2d 251, 253-54 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the "IPA did not control, or retain the
right to control, the professional activities of [the physicians]" and that an IPA Model HMO could
not be subject to vicarious liability because it did not directly employ physicians). See generally
Kanute, supra note 4, at 864.
72. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1270-71; Kanute, supra note 4.
73. Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987).
74. Kanute, supra note 4, at 864-65.
75. Cooper, supra note 1, at 1272; Zamora, supra note 38, at 1049.
76. Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
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Before an HMO will be held vicariously liable, a litigant must establish
several things. The employee-physician must have, in fact, acted negligently in
the treatment of the patient, and the negligent treatment must have caused the
patient's injuries. The litigant must show that the physician's conduct fell below
the standard established by the customary practice of his peers and that this
departure from customary practice caused the injuries. In determining whether
the physician's conduct dropped below the standard of care, the court will
measure the physician's conduct against the conduct of other reasonably
competent physicians under the same or similar circumstances.'
It has been suggested that courts should apply a totally different standard
of care to physicians practicing within an HMO structure:
The law could accept HMO custom as determinative of due care, to
the same extent that insured fee-for-service custom is now accepted,
in effect allowing this subgroup of medical practitioners to set its own
malpractice standards. Whether or not a particular HMO practice was
negligent would thus be judged by the practice of other HMO
providers under comparable circumstances.78
77. Two different approaches to the physician's standard of care have developed. The first
approach, called the same or similar locality nile, gauges a physician's conduct on what other
reasonably competent doctors, in the same or similar circumstances and in the same or similar
locality as the defendant-physician, would have done. See, e.g., Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d
309 (10th Cir. 1978). Under the second approach, the national standard of care approach, what
other reasonably competent doctors would have done in the same or similar circumstance, determines
whether the defendant-physician used reasonable care. The situs of the physician's practice is only
one factor in determining whether reasonable care was used. See, e.g., Vergara v. Doan, 593
N.E.2d 185 (Ind. 1992); Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968). A variation on this
second approach would not consider specific geography considerations. See, e.g., Shilkret v.
Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assoc., 349 A.2d 245 (Md. 1975). Jurisdictions are divided as to
which approach to take. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 32, at 187-88 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Many states will apply a national
standard to specialists and the same or similar locality rule to family practitioners. See Wall v.
Stout, 311 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. 1984). See generally FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9.
78. Bovbjerg, supra note 18, at 1409. Two illustrations will demonstrate the differences
between HMO practice and customary practice. First, an HMO might decide to treat a heart patient
at home to save money rather than in a hospital coronary care unit. While some medical research
from England suggests that at-home care and hospital care produce the same results, customary
practice clearly dictates treatment in the hospital. Thus, such a departure from customary practice
would cause malpractice liability to attach if a patient's condition were to worsen. Id. at 1389-90.
Second, a given test might improve "the accuracy of a diagnosis from ninety to ninety-five percent
in some moderately serious and generally treatable condition." A fee-for-service doctor would order
the test while an HMO might decide to forego the test in order to allocate resources elsewhere. That
decision could subject the HMO to liability because the HMO departed from the customary practices
of physicians in similar circumstances. Id. at 1390. "But most experts for now agree that the
primary duty of care is that which a reasonable physician in the community would have provided,
regardless of HMO decisions about payments for services." Reuben, supra note 1, at 58.
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The following is the main policy argument that is advanced to support an HMO
standard of care instead of the customary practice standard:
The main deficiency of the medical custom rule is that it derives the
malpractice standard of care from medical practice dominated by
insured fee-for-service care, the providers of which can make
decisions with little regard for actual social cost. Applying such
standards to HMO practice pressures HMOs to conform to this non-
optimizing behavior and reduces the likelihood that HMOs will evolve
different styles of practice offering valuable insights to other providers
and to legal standard-setters alike.79
The difficulty with adopting a standard of care determined by the "customary
practice of HMOs" would be that it could immunize substandard care from legal
liability. Consider the case where an HMO employee advised a women who had
an infection as a result of the Dalkon shield that she should douche with
yogurt.8° The court described this treatment as a "substandard lay remedy."'"
Under the customary practice rule, this treatment would clearly lead to liability.
However, the application of a different standard in the HMO context, i.e., what
is customary in an HMO, could immunize such grossly negligent behavior.82
The respectable minority doctrine should sufficiently protect physicians
from liability. This doctrine provides that a physician will not be legally liable
merely because he decides on a particular course of treatment when several
recognized treatments are available so long as reasonably competent members
of his profession would have also selected the same treatment. In other words,
when reasonable doctors disagree over the appropriate method of treatment, a
physician can use his own professional judgment in selecting the method of
treatment.83 Arguably, if reasonable doctors would not disagree over the
appropriateness of treatment provided by an HMO, then apparently no social
benefit would be gained from precluding liability for inappropriate treatment just
because other HMOs were providing the same inappropriate treatment.'
79. Bovbjerg, supra note 18, at 1397.
80. Gugino v. Harvard Community Health Plan, 403 N.E.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Mass. 1980)
(holding Staff Model HMO vicariously liable).
81. Id.
82. The author does not intend to suggest that all HMOs would recommend a yogurt douche
under the circumstances presented in the Gugino case.
83. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, § 6-5, at 382-85; PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 77, § 69, at 499-501. See, e.g., Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
84. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a court may impose tort liability provided that
the HMO is not immune from liability. ERISA preemption may provide some protection, but this
will be discussed later in this article. See infra section V. A few states have specifically immunized
HMOs from tort liability. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26: 2j-25(c)-(d) (West 1996). In Harrell
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2. Ostensible or Apparent Agency
When services are rendered at a business location, the consumer may
reasonably form the impression that the services were provided by an employee
of the business even if the services were provided by an independent contractor.
The doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency springs from the reasonable belief
of the party receiving the service (determined under the totality of circumstances
surrounding the transaction) that an employer-employee relationship existed
between the one employing the independent contractor and the person providing
the service. If the circumstances reasonably create an implied representation
that an employer-employee relationship exists, then vicarious liability will be
imposed.' Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the
doctrine of ostensible or apparent agency:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services
are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to
liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor
in supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer
were supplying them himself or by his servants. 6
v. Total Health Care, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court explained some of the policy reasons for
such a statutory grant of immunity:
The purpose of the statutes authorizing this kind of corporation is to sanction one
method of combatting the cost of health care. Just as the ancient Chinese are reputed
to have paid their doctors while they remained well, a person may elect to pay fixed
dues in advance so that medical services may be available without additional cost when
they are needed. The legislature well might feel that these arrangements were in the
public interest and that those organizations that do not operate for profit should not be
burdened by the additional cost of malpractice litigation . . . . The legislature well
might have considered that one in the position of this plaintiff has an adequate remedy
against the persons actually guilty of malpractice, who are licensed physicians, and does
not need an additional source of recompense from a not-for-profit corporation.
781 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. 1989). See also Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (determining that the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the
HMO was appropriate because the HMO could not practice medicine under Texas law and because
the evidence of control was not sufficient to establish vicarious liability).
85. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 294-97.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965). Courts will often confuse the concept
of apparent or ostensible agency with the concept of agency by estoppel. Occasionally, the terms
will be used interchangeably. See, e.g., Smith v. St. Francis Hosp. Inc., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1983). However, agency by estoppel technically requires stricter proof that the plaintiff
actually relied upon the representation of the business or principal. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d
1376, 1380 (Alaska 1987). The doctrine of agency by estoppel provides:
One who represents that another is his servant or agent and thereby causes a third
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one
appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
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Under the doctrine of ostensible or apparent agency, a hospital may be
vicariously liable for the misconduct of certain physicians, even though they may
technically be independent contractors. Emergency room physicians,
anesthesiologists, radiologists, and pathologists are among the physicians most
commonly found to be ostensible or apparent agents of a hospital.' The
doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency has been found to apply when a
hospital hires physicians to direct or provide services that the hospital has
impliedly represented to the public that it supplies (such as emergency room
services) and when patients look to the hospital to provide the necessary care
without regard to the identity of a particular physician. In contrast, a hospital
will not be vicariously liable when a pre-existing doctor-patient relationship is
found (even if the physician holds staff privileges at the hospital) and when the
patient is subsequently admitted to the hospital, and the hospital merely provides
the situs for the rendition of care.' Thus, "two factors are relevant to a
finding of ostensible agency: (1) whether the patient looks to the institution,
rather than the individual physician, for care; and (2) whether the hospital 'holds
out' the physician as its employee."89 The doctrine of ostensible or apparent
agency does not require proof of express representations that the physician was
a hospital employee, nor does it require proof of specific reliance by the
patient." The following justification is offered in support of such an
imposition of vicarious liability upon hospitals:
Certainly, members of the public who avail themselves of a hospital's
emergency room services under these circumstances have a right to
expect competent medical treatment from the medical personnel
cloaked with ostensible authority by the hospital's conduct which
reasonably leads the public to believe that medical treatment will be
afforded by physicians acting on behalf of the hospital, and not on
their respective individual responsibility. Consequently the hospital
must be held accountable for the negligence, if any, of its authorized
emergency room physician regardless of whether or not he is an
independent contractor by secret limitations contained in private
contract between the hospital and doctor or by virtue of some other
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). Most cases in the area are decided under the
concept of apparent or ostensible agency. A few courts have also held that a hospital is vicariously.
liable when a physician performs an inherent function of the hospital or a non-delegable duty. See,
e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
87. Hardy v. Brantly, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985).
88. Id.; Smith, 676 P.2d at 281.
89. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1380 (Alaska 1987), accord Smith, 676 P.2d at 282.
90. Hardy, 471 So. 2d at 370-71, accord Smith, 676 P.2d at 282-83. In contrast, agency by
estoppel does require specific proof of reliance. For a discussion of the definitions of and difference
between ostensible or apparent agency and agency by estoppel, see supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
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business relationship unknown to the patient and contrary to the
hospital's conduct and representations.9 1
Courts will generally apply this same doctrine to HMOs because many
HMOs, much like hospitals, purport to provide total care coverage for their
members. 92 Therefore, the doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency is one of
the primary theories utilized to hold HMOs vicariously liable for the negligence
of their participating physicians. 93 In the HMO context, litigants must prove
the following: (1) that the patient looked to the HMO for care, rather than the
individual physician; and (2) that the HMO held out the physician as an
employee. Although the doctrine of respondeat superior would result in
vicarious liability more commonly in the Staff and Group Model HMO context
and more rarely in the IPA Model HMO context, the doctrine of apparent or
ostensible agency would likely result in vicarious liability with any HMO model
because the facts of each individual case are more determinative with this
doctrine. Thus, HMOs may be held vicariously liable for physician misconduct
even in the IPA Model' despite the fact that, under this model, physicians do
not directly contract with HMOs (HMOs contract with IPAs who in turn
contract with individual physicians or physician groups). Furthermore, a litigant
could potentially argue the theory of apparent or ostensible agency against any
model of HMO, depending on the control exercised and representations made
by the HMO, because all HMO models share many similarities." Under this
theory, a court has even imposed liability upon an HMO for a consultant who
an HMO physician brought in to review a case.'
An inquiry regarding apparent or ostensible agency is fact intensive, and
a finding of ostensible agency requires more than the presence of the physician's
name on the HMO's approved list of physicians, and more than the requirement
91. Smith, 676 P.2d at 282-83.
92. Chase v. Independent Prac. Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Boyd v.
Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
93. See, e.g., Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. I11. 1994); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983
(E.D. Pa. 1990); Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Chase, 583
N.E.2d at 251; Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); McClellan v.
Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super Ct. 1992); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1229.
94. See, e.g., Raglin, 595 N.E.2d at 158 (affirming the trial court's holding that the evidence
was not sufficient to find an apparent agency with the IPA HMO); Chase, 583 N.E.2d at 255
(holding IPA HMO not vicariously liable under the facts using an ostensible agency theory); Boyd,
547 A.2d at 1229 (applying ostensible agency theory to an IPA HMO).
95. See supra note 36.
96. See Schleier, 876 F.2d at 174.
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that the patient select a physician from a list provided by the HMO.97 Rather,
the HMO's conduct must lead the patient reasonably to believe that an employee
of the HMO, as an institution, is treating the patient. 98 Courts have looked to
the following factors to ascertain whether ostensible or apparent agency is
established: (1) written representations by the HMO, in the form of
advertisements, brochures, or contracts, that the HMO provides a
comprehensive health care system;99 (2) whether "gatekeepers" decide who
accesses the health care system, i.e., whether a primary care provider screens
hospitalizations and referrals to specialists;1' ° (3) whether physicians are paid
by capitation and whether a shared risk pool exists;'' (4) whether patients pay
the HMO or the physician; ° (5) whether patients must choose physicians
from limited lists of approved HMO physicians; 3 (6) whether the HMO
screens physicians who must comply with HMO regulations; " (7) whether
patients can see specialists without the recommendation of their primary care
physicians; s (8) whether patients have choices regarding which specialists to
see;"" (9) whether patients must follow HMO mandates; 7 (10) whether the
HMO solicited the patient's participation within the system;'0 ' (11) whether
the HMO's quality assessment program merely tracks physicians to determine
whether they are complying with HMO regulations or whether the program
reviews the appropriateness of medical diagnoses or care delivered; 9 (12)
whether individual physicians are free to accept or reject particular patients; H°
(13) whether patients are examined at the HMO's office or the private offices
of physicians and whether the HMO or physicians supplied the instruments and
supplies;"' (14) whether patients complain to the HMO or the physicians; (15)
whether the employment contracts between the HMO and physicians provide for
salaries, vacation and sick leave, and insurance coverage; (16) whether
physicians treat only HMO enrolled patients or non-enrolled patients as
97. Kearney, 859 F. Supp. at 187.
98. Id. at 185.
99. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
100. Id. at 1233.
101. Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A. 2d 862, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Boyd, 547 A.2d
at 1234.
102. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Dunn, 606 A.2d at 868; Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988).
106. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235; DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
107. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235.
108. Id.
109. Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 158, (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).
110. Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A. 2d 862, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
111. Id.; Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279, 281 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
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well;"' (17) whether physicians utilize the HMO's forms or stationary; (18)
whether the HMO employs medical directors and whether the decisions of the
medical directors are final;" 3 (19) whether the patient enrolled through the
physician or directly with the HMO;" 4 (20) whether the HMO or the
physicians provide the clerical/support staff; (21) whether the HMO or the
physicians set the rates;" 5 and (22) the HMO's overall control over the
individual physicians. ""
These factors are not meant to be exhaustive, and courts have not indicated
how many factors must be present to impose vicarious liability under the
doctrine of ostensible or apparent agency. Rather, sufficient evidence must
support a conclusion that the patient was looking to the HMO for medical care,
not necessarily the treating physician, and that the HMO represented or
impliedly represented that the physician was an HMO employee. The imposition
of vicarious liability through ostensible agency represents the most common type
of liability action against the HMO. Furthermore, the doctrine of apparent
agency will likely continue to be a favored litigation tool because a cause of
action founded upon vicarious liability is the least likely to be subject to ERISA
preemption. 117
B. Corporate or Direct Liability
The proposition that a hospital could be liable for corporate negligence, that
is, liable for its own acts of negligence as an institution and not just vicariously
for the culpable acts of its employees, is of fairly recent origin, emerging from
112. Shah-Mirany, supra note 12, at 369 n.47.
113. Cooper, supra note 1, at 1272; Zamora, supra note 38, at 1049.
114. Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E. 2d 1104, 1105 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987).
115. Smith, 676 P.2d at 281.
116. Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
117. See infra section V discussing ERISA preemption. See, e.g., Prudential Health Care Plan,
Inc., v. Lewis, 77 F.3d 493 (lOth Cir. 1996); Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151
(10th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Prihoda v. Shpritz,
914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996); Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995);
Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F.
Supp. 544 (S.D. Ill. 1994); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Kearney
v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Burke v. Smithline Bio-Science Lab.,
858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994);
Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. III. 1994); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phila.
College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Independence HMO, Inc. v.
Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 [1998], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss3/3
1998] "SHARED RISK" OF POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY 879
the landmark case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital.",,
Historically, governmental or charitable immunity generally protected hospitals
from legal liability. Because only doctors, not hospitals, could practice
medicine, hospitals were perceived only to provide a facility for doctors to use
as independent contractors, and only doctors, not the hospital, owed a duty to
patients to avoid unreasonable risks of harm arising from the rendition of
medical treatment."' The Darling court rejected the concept that
the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake
to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to
procure them to act upon their own responsibility, [because that
concept] no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their
manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish
facilities for treatment .... Certainly, the person who avails himself
of "hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will attempt to cure
him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own
responsibility. 0
Darling was the first case to impose corporate negligence upon a hospital,
thereby requiring hospitals to monitor the quality of care rendered to individual
patients by physicians who hold staff privileges and imposing a duty upon
hospitals to supervise staff physicians and to require consultations if necessary
for quality patient care.' 2 ' One commentator has argued:
The justifications for the imposition of corporate negligence relate
to the emergence of the hospital as a powerful institution. First, the
public perceives a hospital as a complex entity responsible for care
provided, and relies on the hospital for this care. Second, the hospital
is in the best position to "monitor and control physician performance",
given its opportunities to observe professional practices on a daily
basis, to adopt procedures to detect problems, and to use its medical
staff to monitor quality. Third, tort liability creates incentives for
hospitals to "insure the competency of their medical staffs."'"
118. 211 N.E.2d 253 (I11. 965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966), accordStrubhartv. Perry
Mem'l Hosp. Auth., 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995).
119. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 289-91.
120. Darling, 211 N.E. 2d at 257 (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)).
121. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 253. At least twenty jurisdictions have adopted the corporate
negligence doctrine. See, e.g., Strubhart v. Perry Mem'l Hosp. Auth., 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995).
122. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 302.
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Therefore, the doctrine of corporate liability is a "doctrine under which the
hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care owed the
patient, which is to ensure the patient's safety and well-being while at the
hospital. This theory of liability creates a nondelegable duty which the hospital
owes directly to a patient. "123
HMOs are analogous to hospitals in that they provide total care coverage,
monitor the rendition of professional services, select care givers based on
established criteria and the physicians who will participate within the system,
and often provide the situs for medical treatment as well as necessary support
staff and equipment for care. In so far as applicable theories of liability are
concerned, little difference could be found, for example, between a Staff Model
HMO and a hospital. Therefore, the same legal theories used to hold hospitals
liable can generally be used to hold HMOs liable in' appropriate cases. 124
Several duties might serve as the basis for imposing liability upon HMOs under
corporate negligence, including: a duty to oversee all persons who practice
medicine and to monitor the quality of patient care,12 a duty to use reasonable
care in selecting and retaining only competent physicians, 126 and a duty to use
reasonable care in managing utilization control systems.2 7  Because the
corporate negligence of HMOs is an evolving theory, case law is scarce. 2 8
Because any allegation of corporate negligence is likely to be-disallowed because
of ERISA preemption, the full boundaries of HMO liability for independent,
123. McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
124. Chase v. Independent Prac. Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E. 2d 251 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991); Boyd
v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988),
125. McClellan, 660 A.2d at 98, accord Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 415 (N.J. 1995).
HMOs also have a duty to use reasonable care in maintaining their facility and equipment.
McClellan, 660 A.2d at 98. However, premises liability for HMOs is beyond the scope of this
article.
126. Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 415 (N.J. 1995); McClellan, 660 A.2d at 98.
127. Dunn, 656 A.2d at 415; McClellan, 660 A.2d at 98.
128. In many cases, the allegation of corporate negligence has been raised; however, the
reported decisions have only addressed whether ERISA preempts the cause of action. Thus, courts
do not address the merits of claims of corporate negligence. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health
Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d
151 (10th Cir. 1995); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Spain v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City,
Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1992); Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F.
Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Keamey
v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Burke v. Smithkline Bio-Science Lab.,
858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of
Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996).
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negligent acts are likely to remain a mystery for some time. 2 9 However, this
Section will address each potential argument regarding the direct liability of
HMOs.
1. Duty to Supervise Staff
Hospitals generally have a duty to supervise physicians and monitor the
care provided to patients,13° and at least two courts have suggested that HMOs
should have the duty to monitor patient care. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey stated that an HMO could be potentially liable for negligent control of
physicians,' and a Pennsylvania lower court found it reasonable to require
that an HMO "formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to
ensure quality care for its subscribers."1 32 Although the author is unaware of
any cases imposing liability upon an HMO for its failure to properly monitor
patient care provided by an individual physician, such an argument could prove
to be a new theory of liability-producing conduct. Professor Barry R. Furrow
has noted the likelihood of such a liability theory:
Managed care organizations are likely to face similar duties [as
hospitals] to supervise .... As courts continue to characterize MCOs
[Managed Care Organizations] as health care providers, suits are likely
to increase. Managed care is likely to be forced to undertake both a
duty to select with care and a duty to engage in continuous
supervision. 33
2. Selection of Staff
HMOs owe a duty to use reasonable care in selecting and retaining
participating physicians in order to ensure that only reasonably competent
physicians treat enrolled patients. "3 Stronger logic supports imposing a duty to
129. For a discussion of ERISA preemption, see infra section V. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential
Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59
F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Spain
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas
City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th
Cir. 1992).
130. Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965); Strubhart
v. Perry Mem'l Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995).
131. Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 415 (1995).
132. McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 660 A.2d 97, 99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
133. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 319.
134. Dunn, 656 A.2d at 415; McClellan, 660 A.2d at 99. Hospitals are potentially liable for
negligence in the credentialing of physicians. Strubhart v. Perry Mem'l Hosp. Trust Auth., 903
P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995). Accreditation standards for hospitals requires that "[tihe hospital's
governing body... ultimately is responsible for the quality of care the hospital provides. To carry
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properly select physicians on HMOs than on hospitals:
In the hospital setting, the patient usually has selected the physician.
He is then admitted to the hospital because his physician has admitting
privileges at that hospital. By contrast, in a managed care program
the patient has chosen the particular program, but not the physicians
who are provided. The patient must use the physicians on the panel.
The patient thus explicitly relies on the MCO [Managed Care
Organization] for its selection of health care providers. The MCO's
obligations for the patient's total care are more comprehensive than in
the hospital setting.3
In McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization of Pennsylvania,'3
Marilyn McClellan contracted with an IPA Model HMO to provide health care
coverage for herself and her family. From the list provided by the HMO, she
selected Dr. Hempsey as her primary care physician. In 1985, Dr. Hempsey
out this responsibility, the governing body . . . must provide for the effective functioning of
activities related to . . . medical staff credentialing." 1996 ACCREDITATION MANUAL, JOINT
COMMISSION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS (JCAHO) G.O.2. Furthermore, Medicare
regulations mandate that the governing board must be responsible for credentialing physicians
holding staff privileges. 42 C.F.R. § 482.12 (1996). In the hospital setting, the importance of a
duty to use reasonable care in appointing and retaining staff physicians is demonstrated by studies
that show five percent of physicians applying for positions in a national ambulatory care program
had falsified credentials. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 317 n.8 (citing W. A.
Schaffer et al., Falsification of Clinical Credentials by Physicians Applying for Ambulatory-Staff
Privileges, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 356 (1988)).
135. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 318. See also Karen A. Jordan,
Managed Competition and Limited Choice of Providers: Countering Negative Perceptions Through
a Responsibility to Select Quality Network Physicians, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 875 (1995). Professor
Jordan has suggested that one of the biggest consumer concerns regarding managed care springs
from the inhibition of patient choice in selecting physicians caused by the structure of managed care
organizations. Professor Jordan has written:
Limitation of provider choice concerns consumers largely because of the risk of being
forced to use a lower quality physician. After all, it is unlikely that one MCN can
attract all of the best physicians .... [I]ndividuals ... feel that without control over
choice, they are less able to assure that a physician is qualified and of sufficient integrity
to withstand the financial incentives to undertreat that are inherent in managed care.
Id. at 884. Professor Jordan has argued that "state tort law, with its dual purpose of deterring
unsafe behavior and compensating persons injured by tortfeasors, may provide a particularly
effective means of enforcing the MCN's duty to use reasonable care in selecting network physicians"
and assist in promoting the quality of individual patient care and the overall quality of the managed
care system in general. Id. at 945-946. Furthermore, "[o]ne means of countering negative public
perception of the quality of network physicians is for MCNs to engage in a responsible selective-
contracting process through which those controlling the network formation use reasonable care to
assure that all contracting providers can deliver high-quality health care." Id. at 887. See also John
D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 173 (1996).
136. 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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removed a mole from Marilyn's back, and Dr. Hempsey discarded the mole
without performing a biopsy, even though Marilyn told him that the "mole had
recently undergone a marked change in size and color." Because a biopsy was
not performed on the mole, Marilyn's malignant melanoma was not timely
diagnosed, and she died in 1988.' In a negligence action against the HMO,
the plaintiffs alleged that the HMO had a duty to properly select physicians who
were competent to provide care, that Marilyn relied upon the expertise of the
HMO in screening physicians when she selected Dr. Hempsey as her primary
care physician, that the HMO breached that duty because Dr. Hempsey was not
qualified to render medical care, and that Marilyn would have survived had the
HMO used reasonable care in selecting participating physicians. 38 The court
found that allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action
for "negligence in the selection, retention, and/or evaluation of the primary care
physician."' 3 9 In reaching its decision to impose liability on the HMO, the
court relied on established law as contained within the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 323,4 which provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking. 4'
Thus, in order to state a cause of action that the HMO breached its duty to
use reasonable care in selecting participating physicians, the litigant must
sufficiently prove four factual allegations. First, the litigant must allege that the
HMO undertook to render the service of physician screening to the patient.
Second, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the HMO should recognize that
the service is necessary for the protection of subscribers. Third, the plaintiff
must also show that the "HMO failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting,
retaining, and/or evaluating the plaintiff's primary care physician." Fourth, the
litigant must allege that the risk of harm to the plaintiff has increased as a result
137. Id. at 1054-55.
138. Id. at 1057.
139. Id. at 1059.
140. Id.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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of the HMO's failure to use reasonable care.
142
Although McClellan is apparently the only reported decision to impose
liability under this theory, increased litigation will follow based on the theory
of an HMO's direct liability for its failure to use reasonable care in the selection
and retention of participating physicians. All HMO models could be susceptible
to this liability theory because most require patients to choose their primary care
provider and specialists from approved lists. One survey concluded that
"[n]inety-two percent of the network or IPA HMOs and 61 percent of the group
or staff HMOs required their patients to select a primary care physician. "143
Therefore, most HMOs could become potential defendants under the theory
espoused in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323 (undertaking to
render the service of screening participating physicians upon which a patient
relies with resulting injuries) especially when ninety-three percent of all HMOs
have a "formal process for recredentialing physicians."'"
3. Utilization Review
A 1995 survey published in the New England Journal of Medicine collected
empirical data on HMOs nationally and concluded that procedures for utilization
review were present in almost all plans. 45 Written quality assurance plans
were present in ninety-five percent of the HMOs. According to the survey,
"[sleventy-nine percent of the group or staff HMOs and 70 percent of the
network or IPA HMOs required outcome studies for particular clinical
conditions," with the most common being the study of asthma and diabetic
treatments and the use of mammography.'" "About three quarters of the
HMOs ...used formal, written practice guidelines. These most commonly
applied to childhood immunizations, the management of asthma, mammographic
screening, and screening for colorectal cancer [cancer of the colon]. " 117
Utilization review is a defining characteristic of HMOs so it is indeed not
142. McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization of Pennsylvania, 604 A.2d 1053, 1059
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
143. Gold, supra note 36, at 1678.
144. Id. at 1680.
145. Id. at 1681. Utilization review is a cost-containment process which examines health care
services "to ensure that the services provided are both necessary and cost-efficient." Cheralyn E.
Schessler, Liability Implications of Utilization Review as a Cost Containment Mechanism, 8 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 380 (1992). "[Hlealth care serviclel for a specific patient is
compared to an established norm for the use of similar services for comparable patients." Id. at
382. An HMO employee, who may or may not be a physician, or an independent corporation
specializing in utilization review may conduct the utilization review. See id. at 390. See also
Thomas M. Wickizer, The Effects of Utilization Review on Hospital Use and Expenditures: A
Covariance Analysis, 27 HEALTH SERVICES REs. 103 (1992).
146. Gold, supra note 36, at 1681.
147. Id.
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surprising that courts have begun to impose a duty upon HMOs to use
reasonable care "in the management of utilization control systems" 4 ' in order
to avoid subjecting patients to unreasonable risks of harm caused by negligent
utilization review.
In Wickline v. California, '49 the California Court of Appeals held:
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care
which should have been provided is not provided should recover for
the injuries suffered from all those responsible for the deprivation of
such care, including, when appropriate, health care payors. Third
party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the
design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for
example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or
hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably disregarded or
overridden. 150
In Wickline, the plaintiff, Lois Wickline, suffered from arteriosclerosis and
occlusion of the aorta into her legs, known as Leriche's Syndrome. The only
medical treatment was to remove a part of the artery and insert a synthetic graft.
The plaintiff underwent the surgery, but complications led to the performance
of a lumbar sympathectomy. Her treating physician requested an additional
eight days of hospitalization which he deemed medically necessary because of
the danger of infection and/or clotting. The HMO refused the additional eight
days, allowing only four. The treating physician did not appeal the HMO's
decision, and the plaintiff was released. Further complications developed, and
physicians were unable to save the plaintiff's leg when she returned to the
hospital. According to her treating physician, the plaintiff would not have lost
148. Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 415 (N.J. 1995). See also Williams v. HealthAmerica,
535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an HMO could be liable for bad faith conduct
in administering its established complaint system). In Williams, the primary care physician had seen
the plaintiff for over a year for abdominal pain, severe cramping, and rectal pain. Id. at 718. The
primary care physician repeatedly refused to refer her to a gynecologist despite her frequent requests
for referral. Id. at 719. When the plaintiff complained to HealthAmerica, a representative told her
that referral to a specialist was "strictly up to" the primary care physician. Id. Plaintiff finally went
to the emergency room and was referred to a specialist outside the plan who diagnosed her condition
as endometriosis. Id. The court held that material questions of fact existed on the issue of whether
the HMO had handled the claim in good faith. Id. at 721. When the coverage is purchased through
an employer-sponsored plan, however, ERISA is likely to preempt any allegation of bad faith in the
denial of a claim. See generally Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
149. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
150. Id. at 819.
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her leg had she remained in the hospital for the additional eight days, as he
requested. 5'
The Wickline court first noted the danger posed by prospective utilization
review, which is common in HMOs:
A mistaken conclusion about medical necessity following
retrospective review will result in the wrongful withholding of
payment. An erroneous decision in a prospective review process, on
the other hand, in practical consequences, results in the withholding
of necessary care, potentially leading to a patient's permanent
disability br death.'52
The court did acknowledge that a cause of action could be stated against an
HMO when "a cost containment program is applied in a manner which is
alleged to have affected the implementation of the treating physician's medical
judgment."' 53 However, the facts in Wickline did not support such a theory
of recovery because the treating physician ultimately decided to discharge the
plaintiff without making some attempt to keep her in the hospital, such as by
appealing the medical director's decision to disallow the additional time in the
hospital. As the court stated,
[T]he physician who complies without protest with the limitations
imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates
otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's
care. He cannot point to the health care payor as the liability
scapegoat when the consequences of his own determinative medical
decisions go sour."'
In Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California,' however, the same
court that decided Wickline held that the Wickline language suggesting that "civil
liability for a discharge decision rests solely within the responsibility of a
treating physician in all contexts is dicta."' 56 The California court reaffirmed
its commitment to impose a duty on HMOs to use reasonable care when
implementing their utilization review to avoid injuring subscribers by
unreasonably withholding necessary medical care. 57 In Wilson, the decedent
151. Id. at 812-17.
152. Id. at 812.
153. Id. at 811.
154. Id. at 819.
155. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
156. Id. at 880.
157. Id. at 878.
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was admitted to the hospital on March 1, 1983, for major depression, anorexia,
and drug dependency. On March 11, the insurance company announced it
would not pay for further care although the treating physician determined that
the patient needed three to four weeks of in-patient care at the hospital. The
decedent was discharged because no one could afford the hospitalization without
insurance coverage. Shortly thereafter, decedent committed suicide. 5  An
expert testified that "there was a reasonabl[e] medical probability that the
decedent would have been alive if his hospital stay had not been prematurely
terminated." 5 9 The appellate court held that the trial court erred in granting
the defendant's motion for summary judgment because material issues of fact
existed in the record as to whether the insurance company was a substantial
factor in causing the decedent's death."'6
The Wilson court distinguished Wickline, arguing that three factors were
present in Wickline that were absent in Wilson. In Wickline, a statutorily created
HMO system was involved which was designed to provide medical care to
indigents; testimony was presented that the final decision to discharge, despite
the initial request for additional days in the hospital, complied with the standards
of the medical community; and the cost-containment program in Wickline was
not shown to have corrupted medical judgment.' 6' The Wilson court
concluded that the holding in Wickline was not applicable because none of these
three factors were present in Wilson; therefore, granting summary judgment was
inappropriate.1 62
Certainly, the holding in Wilson, that the treating physician's failure to
challenge a third-party payor's decision to deny coverage will not automatically
preclude liability against the HMO or insurance carrier, conforms more to
traditional tort law. 163  If HMOs have a duty to use reasonable care in
158. Id. at 877-78.
159. Id. at 882.
160. Id. at 878.
161. Id. at 879.
162. Id.
163. The physician's negligence in failing to challenge the HMO's decision not to cover
recommended care would appear to be a foreseeable intervening cause with regard to the HMO's
negligence in utilization review. In this context, an intervening cause is a cause that "actively
operates" in producing a patient's harm after the HMO's prior negligent act in utilization review.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441(1) (1965). Generally, a foreseeable intervening cause
will not exonerate or supersede the liability of the original tortfeasor. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 77, § 44, at 303-06. For the definition of superseding cause, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). A negligent intervening cause will generally not break the causal
chain. Id. § 447. The Restatement provides three alternatives when negligent intervention is
foreseeable. Applying these alternatives to an HMO's failure to use reasonable care in utilization
review and assuming that the physician's failure to fight the outcome of utilization review is a
negligent act, the physician's conduct would clearly be foreseeable because it complies with all three
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implementing their utilization review procedures in order to avoid exposing
patients to unreasonable risks of harm from inappropriate decisions not to treat,
not to refer to a specialist, not to hospitalize, or not to order diagnostic tests,
decisions that do not comply with customary medical practice, then the
physician's failure to appeal or challenge in some way the decision to deny
services would appear to be a foreseeable intervening cause which would
generally not supersede the initial tortfeasor's liability." Application of
traditional tort principles leads to the conclusion that the physician's conduct is
foreseeable, and the physician's intervening conduct is not independent of the
situation the HMO created.'" In fact, the physician's conduct is very
dependent upon the HMO's failure to authorize or provide care, and the
physician's conduct causes the very harm to the patient that one would expect
to result from improper utilization review." 6 Where the negligent utilization
review creates a risk of harm, "the fact that the harm is brought about through
the intervention of another force does not relieve" the HMO of liability. 67
Furthermore, the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 443 provides: "The
intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by
the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such
conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about." " The physician's
compliance with the dictates of the utilization review, and failure to challenge
those dictates, appears to be a normal consequence of a situation created by the
HMO.' 6
For example, the HMO in Wickline was negligent in not authorizing eight
additional days of hospitalization, and the plaintiff would not have lost her leg
had the request for additional time for hospital care been granted. 70 The
physician's misconduct, in failing to challenge the decision to deny care, is a
normal consequence of the negligent prospective utilization review.' 7 ' The
physician's conduct exposed the patient to the same risk of losing her limb as
the HMO's initially rendered negligent decision not to allow further
alternatives for foreseeability, not just one. First, the HMO should have realized the physician
might so act. Second, a reasonable person would not regard it as extraordinary that the physician
might not challenge the HMO utilization review. Third, the action of the physician is a normal
consequence of the situation the HMO created. See Id. § 447. Furthermore, a court will usually
consider the physician's negligence to be foreseeable when a third party injures an individual and
the physician's negligence increases the plaintiffs damages. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
77, § 44, at 309.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965).
165. Id. § 442(c).
166. Id. § 442(a). See, e.g., Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955).
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B (1965).
168. Id. § 443.
169. See id.
170. Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812-817 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 443, 447(c) (1965).
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hospitalization.'" The physician's misconduct does not "operat[e]
independently of any situation created by " " the HMO's negligence in
declining needed care. The physician's acquiescence with the HMO's decision
to decline services is seemingly foreseeable because a physician would
reasonably believe that the HMO has the power to dictate when a patient must
be discharged from the hospital." 4
Or, as the Wilson court stated, the treating physician's failure to request
that the third-party payor reconsider did not justify the granting of summary
judgment, especially when no evidence suggested that such reconsideration
would have been granted. 75  At most, the HMO's negligent conduct
(utilization review declining treatment provided in accordance with customary
practice) and the physician's conduct (failing to fight or appeal the decision
resulting from utilization review) would appear to be concurrent causes. 7 6
Thus, both the HMO and the physician should be held liable for the entire cost
of the patient's injury,'" not just the physician.
Furthermore, the treating physician's failure to appeal the medical director's
decision or to request reconsideration would appear to be very foreseeable in the
HMO context because the physician is acting under circumstances where a
conflict of interest arguably exists. The more the physician fights for the patient
to receive appropriate treatment, the less the physician might be paid, and the
more the physician might be threatened with the removal of his or her name
from the list of approved physicians. If cost-containment goals are not achieved,
the physician might not be allowed to continue to treat enrolled patients.17 8
172. Id. §§ 442(a), 442B.
173. Id. § 442(c).
174. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
175. Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 884-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
176. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 77, § 41, at 268, and § 47, at 328-29. Each
defendant's misconduct can be a legal cause of the plaintiff's harm so long as each defendant's
misconduct is "a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 431 (1965). Furthermore, a defendant's misconduct does not need to be the sole cause of the
harm to impose liability. The fact that multiple defendants produced harm to the plaintiff will not
exonerate the defendants from liability; each defendant's misconduct can still be considered a
substantial factor in causing the loss. Id. § 439.
177. If two defendants cause indivisible harm to a plaintiff, harm that is incapable of a
reasonable basis of apportionment between the defendants, then both defendants are liable for the
plaintiff's damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
178. See Mehlman, supra note 26, at 300. For a description of the conflict of interest, see
supra note 28. "Quite frequently MCOs shift financial risk for medical decisions to doctors,
creating conflicts of interests and possibly biasing their judgment." Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer
Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform Proposals, and Trade-Offs, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1319,
1379 (1996). See also David C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians
Be Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821 (1995); Frances H. Miller, Doctors'
Conflicts of Interest (& Altruism) in the United States and Great Britain, 27 IND. L. REV. 687
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Thus, the physician could experience severe economic ramifications from
fighting the system. Therefore, a physician's failure to appeal or challenge
seems very foreseeable (more so than in a fee-for-service plan) and should not
negate the HMO's liability for failing to use reasonable care in implementing
utilization review.
Given the Wickline and Williams decisions, litigation against HMOs on a
theory of their failure to use reasonable care in the utilization review process
will likely increase. 79 When utilization review results in inappropriate or no
treatment, failures to refer to specialists, failures to hospitalize patients, and
failures to render proper care that result in injuries to patients, HMOs will likely
be forced to bear some of the burden that treating physicians already bear
through exposure to malpractice liability. Arguably, fairness dictates that
physicians should not be the sole targets for malpractice litigation when cost-
containment efforts and utilization review procedures impede the professional
judgment of physicians and preclude them from exercising the standard of care
the medical profession customarily follows in similar circumstances. "Such
payor accountability for withholding necessary care due to defective utilization
review is consistent with both insurer bad faith cases and hospital liability
principles, and reinforces the value of a well-designed system of review.""
(1994); Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241 (1995).
179. See generally Conrad & Seiter, supra note 6; Michael A Dowell, Avoiding HMO Liability
for Utilization Review, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 117 (1991). Litigants frequently allege corporate
negligence against HMOs as a basis for relief. See authorities collected supra note 128. Legislation
is likely to increase as well as litigation. Legislation will likely target certain instances where plans
are not providing sufficient coverage to enrollees. In California alone, one hundred health care bills
have been introduced. Ellwood & Lundberg, supra note 12, at 1085. In 1996, state legislatures
throughout the country introduced 1000 bills regulating HMOs, and 35 states ultimately enacted 56
laws. Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary?, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1601 (1996). The most notable of such legislative attempts to curb abuses of utilization
review was the Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1995 which requires a minimum hospital stay of
48 hours for the mother and child after delivery of the child. Mother's Health Protection Act of
1995, S. 969, 104th Cong. (June 1995).
180. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 326. At least one case has dealt with
the bad faith denial of coverage. See Williams v. HealthAmerica, 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) See discussion supra note 148. One author suggests that a "Medical Injury Compensation
Fund" could be set up to compensate patients for injuries resulting from cost-containment efforts and
utilization review. The fund would be created out of insurance premium payments and would appear
to work in much the same way as worker's compensation. Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care,
Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost
Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1 (1993).
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4. Cost-Containment Incentives
All types of HMOs, regardless of the model, usually employ performance-
based incentives and cost-containment mechanisms, such as risk-sharing,
capitation payments, and adjusted payments.' The purpose of these cost-
containment incentives is to save costs. A secondary effect of these financial
incentives and mechanisms is that they may create disincentives for physicians
to refer patients to specialists, to order hospitalization, or to order diagnostic
tests. The question whether the financial incentives contained within the HMO
structure cause negligent medical care or inappropriate denial of services is ripe
for judicial determination.
In Pulvers v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,"2 the plaintiff argued that
the defendant had an incentive payment plan which lead participating physicians
to make conservative decisions regarding diagnostic tests and treatments. Under
the incentive plan, physicians would receive extra compensation for ordering less
expensive care." 3 In Pulvers, the patient died after the physicians delayed a
diagnostic biopsy that would have revealed Bowen's disease.' 8  However,
testimony was presented that the delay was medically justified because the
patient was also being treated for leukemia."s  Although the Pulvers court
seemed to recognize that in appropriate cases litigants may utilize this theory of
relief, no evidence suggested that the "individual doctors act[ed] negligently or
that they refrain[ed] from recommending whatever diagnostic procedures or
treatments the accepted standards of their profession require[d]."8
In Bush v. Dake,"7 an unreported decision, the plaintiff, Sharon Bush,
sued her HMO contending that its system of financial incentives delayed the
diagnosis of her cervical cancer. The financial incentive program included a
shared risk pool and capitation payments. Sharon selected Dr. Dake as her
primary care physician and consulted him in August, 1985, regarding vaginal
bleeding and mucus discharge. In January, 1986, Sharon requested a referral
to a specialist in gynecology, which Dr. Dake granted. The specialist performed
181. Gold, supra note 36, at 1680. See statistical breakdown supra note 36. On the pros and
cons of cost-containment incentives, see David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less:
Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996); Henry T. Greely, Direct
Financial Incentives in Managed Care: Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53 (1996).
182. 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
183. rd. at 393-94.
184. Id. at 393.
185. Id. at 395.
186. Id. at 394.
187. File No. 86-25767 NM-2 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Saginaw County 1989), reprinted in BARRY R.
FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW, CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMs 719-22 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
FURROW Er AL., CASES & MATERIALS].
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a vaginal smear test but did not perform a pap smear. Although Sharon's
condition persisted, Dr. Dake denied her request for a second referral. In May,
1986, Sharon went to an emergency room where a pap smear was taken, and the
diagnosis of cervical cancer was made. Had a pap smear been performed
earlier, the cancer would have been diagnosed at an earlier date. However,
under the HMO system, only the primary care physician could perform pap
smears, and the primary care physician was not compensated above the normal
capitation payment for performing the pap smear. In her suit, the plaintiff
alleged that the financial incentives not to perform the pap smear delayed the
diagnosis of her cervical cancer.' 88
The court rejected the plaintiff's first contention that the HMO's financial
disincentives to proper treatment, referral, and hospitalization were against
public policy, reasoning that the legislature had sanctioned such systems,
including financial incentives, through an HMO enabling act.' 89 However, the
court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the HMO's
system of cost-containment incentives "in and of itself proximately contributed
to the malpractice in this case. . . ." The court continued, "Documentary
evidence has been presented which supports the plaintiff's theory that the
manner in which the system operated in this case contributed to the improper
treatment and delay in diagnosis of Mrs. Bush's cancerous condition. . . . The
question should be submitted to the jury for determination at trial." 90
The physicians in Bush v. Dake were glaringly negligent, clearly failing to
follow the customary medical practice of their peers-other doctors in the same
or similar circumstances would have performed the pap smear. However, the
financial incentives not to perform the test could make the physician's negligent
conduct foreseeable, and the physician's negligence should not exonerate the
HMO that created the financial disincentives that caused the physician not to
follow customary medical practice.' 91  Section 442A of the Restatement
provides: "Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the
foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of another force, and is a
substantial factor in causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding
cause." " If a physician's negligence (in failing to order diagnostic tests,
hospitalization, or referrals to specialists) is caused by the HMO's financial
incentives, it is the HMO's negligence that actually created or increased the risk
of harm when it created the financial incentive program, and the HMO's
188. See FURROW Er AL., CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 187, at 720-21.
189. Id. at 721.
190. Id. Bush v. Dake was settled on appeal. See FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note
9, at 315.
191. For a discussion of intervening causes, see supra notes 163-78 and accompanying text.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442A (1965).
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misconduct should still be considered a substantial factor in causing the patient's
harm because the physician's intervention is in response to the HMO's initial
negligence and, as such, is not a superseding cause.'93
Once again, participating physicians, operating within the HMO context,
encounter a clear conflict of interest 19-the more treatment he provides, the
more he orders diagnostic tests, the more he refers to specialists, the less he will
be compensated. When cost-containment incentives are a substantial factor in
causing negligent medical care, the HMO, not just the physician, will likely be
the target of future litigation.
5. Duty to Disclose Financial Incentives
In the landmark case of Moore v. Regents of the University of
California,1" the Supreme Court of California held that a physician had a
fiduciary duty to disclose to the patient potential conflicts of interest, "personal
interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that
may affect the physician's medical judgment." 1 " The court stated:
The possibility that an interest extraneous to the patient's health has
affected the physician's judgment is something that a reasonable
patient would want to know in deciding whether to consent to a
proposed course of treatment. It is material to the patient's decision
and, thus, a prerequisite to informed consent."9
193. Id.
194. See Mehlman, supra note 26; supra note 28 and accompanying text; supra note 178 and
accompanying text; sources cited infra note 198.
195. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), accord Arato v. Avedon, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), pet. review granted, 839 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1992).
196. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
197. Id. The doctrine of informed consent is premised on the notion that every person has the
right to determine what shall be done to his own body. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105
N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). In some jurisdictions, physicians are required to disclose what other
physicians would disclose under similar circumstances, i.e., medical custom sets the informational
obligation. Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88 (Ark. 1980); Wooley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123
(Me. 1980); Troy v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 86 A.D.2d 631 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982). Other jurisdictions base the physician's disclosure obligation upon the informational needs
of the patient, not medical custom. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979). The physician must disclose all material risks
to the patient, that is, all risks that would materially influence a patient's decision to forego the
recommended treatment. Material risks include inherent risks of the proposed treatment, alternative
treatments and their risks, and the risks involved with no treatment. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at
786-87; Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1982); Scott, 606 P.2d at
566.
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The academic literature suggests that physicians should at least disclose
financial disincentives for treatment, tests, referrals, or hospitalization. 19
8
However, courts have yet to recognize a duty to disclose to patients the financial
incentives of HMOs. Although litigants have argued that a duty to disclose
financial disincentives for referrals to specialists or hospitalization should exist,
they have not yet met with successful results.99
Moreover, "gag clauses," which are contained in contracts between
physicians and HMOs, are the major impediment to such a duty of disclosure.
A "gag clause" is a contractual provision that precludes a physician from
discussing certain information with patients: the financial incentives that the
HMO provides, alternative treatments that the HMO does not cover, and
possibly even anything that presents the HMO in a negative fashion. 2 , These
"gag clauses" prevent physicians from performing their ethical obligation to
provide proper disclosure of treatment alternatives,2"' and it would seem that
they would clearly subject HMOs to the possibility of being defendants in tort
actions under the doctrine of informed consent. Furthermore, HMOs could
arguably have an independent informational obligation to disclose financial
disincentives to treatment, referrals to specialists, or hospitalization when
patients enroll with them.2"e
198. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 214-17 (1993); Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from
Their Physicians, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 291 (1994); Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial
Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health
Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989); Alan L. Hillman, Financial
Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743
(1987); Donald F. Levinson, Toward Full Disclosure of Referral Restrictions and Financial
Incentives by Prepaid Health Plans, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1729 (1987); McGraw, supra note 178,
at 1837.
199. Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 1994); Teti v. U.S. Healthcare, 1989
WL 143274 (E.D. Pa.), aftd, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1990) (dismissing case for lack of federal
jurisdiction).
200. HMOs Shouldn't Gag Doctors, NEWSDAY, Feb. 9, 1996, at 42, available in 1996 WL
2512044.
201. AMA Condemns "Gag Clauses," THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 9, 1996, at All,
available in 1996 WL 3121775. In 1996, Congress introduced legislation to curb the use of gag
clauses. See Patient Right to Know Act of 1996, H.R. 2976, 104th Cong. (1996). Under the Act,
contractual provisions between a health plan and participating physician could not restrict or interfere
with medical communications between a physician and his or her patient. Thus, "gag clauses"
would be prohibited. Id. § 2(a)(1). Medical communications between the physician and patient
would include treatment options, variation of services of other providers, the utilization review
process, and any financial incentives or disincentives to limit services. Id. § 2(b)(2). The penalty
imposed under the Act was up to $25,000 for each violation or up to $100,000 per violation if there
was a pattern of such violations. Id. § 2(c).
202. McGraw, supra note 178, at 1836-39.
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Any cause of action for failure to disclose encounters a serious
difficutly-in order to establish a causal link between the failure to achieve
informed consent and the patient's resulting injuries, the plaintiff must show not
only that the physician had a obligation to inform the patient and failed to do so,
but also that the patient would have chosen a different course of treatment had
the disclosure been made. 3 Assume that a physician believes a patient should
be hospitalized for a certain treatment or procedure, but the HMO will not cover
the cost of hospitalization, and the physician recommends out-patient care. The
physician discloses neither the alternative of hospitalized care nor the fact that
the doctor will receive more money out of the shared risk pool if fewer
hospitalizations are ordered. Because both facts would appear to be material to
the patient's decision regarding the out-patient treatment, the physician appears
to have violated his duty of disclosure. The patient then suffers injuries from
*complications that would have been treated earlier had the patient been in the
hospital. However, the patient probably would not have acted differently had
proper disclosure been made. It is difficult to see how a patient would make a
decision for treatment within a hospital when the HMO will not pay for the
hospitalization costs. If the treatment were necessary for the patient's health,
the reasonable patient would probably "choose" the covered out-patient care.
If the procedure were truly elective, then the patient could have foregone the
treatment altogether, and thus avoided the resulting injuries. However, this
latter scenario would appear remote because the HMO's plan would probably
not cover truly elective procedures. Patients under the fee-for-service system
would appear to have more choice.' 4
Thus, the plaintiff who brings a lawsuit alleging a failure to receive
informed consent might confront an insurmountable causal burden because a
disclosure of the HMO's financial incentive progam would not likely result in
different treatment or care and thus would not avoid the resulting injuries. For
this reason, litigation arguing a duty to disclose might not be the best avenue to
203. Compare Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D. C. Cir. 1972) (establishing causation
when a reasonable patient in the same situation as the plaintiff would have foregone the treatment,
i.e., an objection standard for causation), with Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979)
(establishing causation when the individual patient, regardless of what a reasonable patient would
have done, would have decided against the treatment, i.e., a subjective standard for causation).
204. Marc A. Rodwin has argued:
The consumer is sovereign only at the point of choosing between managed care plans.
Once enrolled, choices that consumers traditionally would make are mediated by the
organization and subject to its approval. For instance, consumers usually must get a
referral from a primary care physician to see a specialist, and primary care physicians
have financial incentives to limit such referrals. Furthermore, consumers frequently
must obtain approval from the organization to receive many specialty services and
nonemergency procedures.
Rodwin, supra note 178, at 1330-31. See also Jordan, supra note 135, at 883-84.
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recover against HMOs.2"e Furthermore, "conflicts of interest can cloud
physician's judgment and affect their assessment of whether a medical service
is needed,"2' even if a physician were to comply with any duty to disclose the
HMO's financial incentives. Arguably, "[p]atients need an opinion from a
physician who is not compromised, " " not just the information that the
physician is, in fact, compromised.
6. The Physician as Plaintiff
In HMO litigation, a new theory of liability could arise whereby the
plaintiff is the financially injured physician, not a physically injured patient.
Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc.2"1 involved a physician, Dr.
Harper, who had been a participating surgeon with Healthsource HMO for over
ten years. In 1994, Dr. Harper realized that Healthsource was "manipulating
and skewing the records of treatment he had provided to several of his patients
and that such inaccuracies adversely affected other subsequent reports. " '
Shortly after Dr. Harper complained to Healthsource regarding his patients'
records, Healthsource notified him that his contract was terminated because he
had not satisfied Healthsource's recredentialing criteria. However, the
credentialing committee had, in fact, reviewed his record and found no quality
of care problem. 10 The New Hampshire Supreme Court allowed Dr. Harper
to challenge the decision not to reappoint him because the termination could
violate public policy and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The court stated, "We conclude that the public interest and fundamental fairness
demand that an HMO's decision to terminate its relationship with a particular
physician provider must comport with the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and may not be made for a reason that is contrary to public policy." 21 1
The Harper decision provides recourse, on public policy grounds, for
physicians who are not reappointed as participating physicians within an HMO.
The plaintiff-physician who must pay monetary damages because of a medical
205. McGraw, supra note 178, at 1843-47 (arguing that, in the HMO context, the cause of
action for informed consent is cumbersome and not a likely avenue of relief).
206. RODWIN, supra note 198, at 215. See also McGraw, supra note 178, at 1839 (suggesting
that physicians might not consciously refrain from recommending treatment due to costs but instead
might "internalize the need to consider cost in treatment decisions; in other words, they will still
make treatment decisions based on medical necessity, but couched within the definition of medical
necessity is a consideration of how much the treatment may personally cost the physician").
207. RODWIN, supra note 198, at 215.
208. 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
209. Id. at 963.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 966. See Aynah V. Askanas, Physician Terminations in Managed Care: Why Are
They Occurring? How Do We Ensure They Are Just?, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 167 (1996).
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malpractice verdict in a case involving injury that resulted from an HMO's
improper utilization review or cost-containment procedures may also have a
cause of action for contribution." 2 In Dunn v. Praiss,213 Dr. Marmar settled
a claim brought by an injured patient for $2,904,160.54.24 Dr. Marmar then
brought a contribution suit against the HMO, claiming that the HMO had a duty
to coordinate the care of the patient among its physicians, that the coordination
of care had not occurred in the critical stages of the patient's treatment, and that
the HMO's failure to coordinate care was a contributing factor to the negligent
care that the plaintiff received. 15 The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
that such a right of contribution could exist but concluded in Dunn that the
physician did not do the "finger pointing" at the proper stage of the litigation
and therefore could not raise the issue.21 6 Rather, Dr. Marmar should have
"stake[d] out his position as to the causative fault" of the HMO at the first trial
of the case.2
17
A defense that "the HMO made me do it" may be on the legal horizons for
physician-defendants in malpractice actions.2"' A physician might use this
defense in a contribution suit in which the physician contends that the HMO's
improper utilization review or financial incentive structure was a significant
factor in causing the malpractice and patient's resulting injuries. However,
"there are many strategic reasons for initially declining to prosecute a claim for
contribution. Physicians, for example, may choose to defend charges of
malpractice by denying that there was any negligence at all because finger-
pointing among the defendants would accrue only to the benefit of the
plaintiff."29
212. While contribution rules vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, contribution among
multiple defendants is allowed in most jurisdictions. If the negligence of two defendants causes the
plaintiffs damage and the plaintiff collects his damages from only one defendant, the defendant who
has paid the plaintiffs damages may seek contribution from the other negligent defendant. See
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 77, at 336-41. Some require a joint judgment against both
defendants before contribution is allowed; others have trial procedures to join defendants in the
plaintiff s action to permit contribution. Id. at 338.
213. 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995).
214. Id. at 418.
215. Id. at 421-22.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 421.
218. Reuben, supra note 1, at 60.
219. Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 421 (N.J. 1995).
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V. THE ISSUE OF ERISA PREEMPTION
A. Overview of ERISA Preemption
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974220 (ERISA) to "protect employees from administrative and funding
abuses" in employee pension plans and to establish "fair vesting requirements
for pensions. ""' The goal of ERISA was to protect employees, not
employers.'- In an effort to create national uniformity of laws governing
pension plans, ERISA was designed to preempt conflicting state laws.
However, "the'use of ERISA's preemption clause to protect employers and
ERISA benefit plans from conflicting state laws is only an ancillary purpose to
the primary purpose of protecting employees' benefits from the employers'
administrative and funding abuses."'
In displacing state law, ERISA's preemption clause provides that ERISA
"supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan."224 This preemption clause is "the most
expansive preemption provision contained in federal law, " ' and the question
whether a state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan and is thus preempted
is "one of the most heavily litigated topics in the law of plans."226 The United
States Supreme Court has held that the term "relates to" should be given a
broad, common-sense meaning." With the sheer amount of litigation and
varying interpretations, it is questionable whether the term "relates to" has any
"common-sense" meaning.' 8 Perhaps, as a result of the multitude of varying
judicial interpretations, the law regarding ERISA preemption "remains unsettled
and confused. " 729
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
221. Pittman, supra note 8, at 358.
222. Id. at 359.
223. Id. at 360.
224. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
225. JAY CONISON, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN A NUTSHELL 314 (1993). See also Spain
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., I1 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993).
226. CONISON, supra note 225, at 315.
227. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), accord Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc.,
865 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
228. Conison, supra note 6, at 624.
229. CONISON, supra note 225, at 315.
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Enrollees purchase approximately seventy-five percent of all coverage
provided by HMOs through employment benefit plans. 230 ERISA governs
such plans, and matters that "relate to" the plans are subject to ERISA
preemption. Thus, when an enrollee is injured through the negligent provision
of medical care and sues the HMO alleging that the HMO is either vicariously
liable for the conduct of the treating physician (under the doctrine of respondeat
superior or ostensible or apparent agency) or directly liable as an institution
(under the doctrine of corporate negligence), one question becomes
important-should ERISA preempt such a negligence cause of action, which is
grounded in state law, because the suit "relates to" the benefit plan?
If a cause of action is subject to ERISA preemption, then the doctrine of
.complete preemption" applies, and federal jurisdiction exists as an exception
to the "well-pleaded complaint rule.""' Normally, a court only examines the
plaintiff's "well-pleaded complaint" to ascertain the presence of federal question
jurisdiction. 32 The "well-pleaded complaint rule" provides that the "issues
raised in the plaintiff's complaint, not those added in the defendant's response,
control the litigation" 2 3 and "the defendant cannot cause a transfer to federal
court simply by asserting a federal question in his responsive pleading."' An
exception to the "well-pleaded complaint rule" arises when Congress intends so
completely to preempt state law235 that subject matter jurisdiction resides in
federal court, "even if the complaint does not mention a federal basis of
jurisdiction."26 Thus, the "complete preemption" doctrine addresses federal
230. FURROW ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 187, at 52 n. 1 (Supp. 1996-97).
Approximately, 150 million people are covered by employer-sponsored health plans governed by
ERISA. Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1986 (1996).
231. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1486-87 (7th Cir. 1996).
232. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
233. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1486.
234. Id. (quoting Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637,639 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Metropolitan Life,
481 U.S. at 63)). A preemption defense raised in the defendant's answer is not the basis of original
federal jurisdiction nor for the removal to federal court of a claim filed in state court. Jass, 88 F.3d
at 1486.
235. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) (appling the doctrine of
complete preemption to a claim pursued under state law because it came within the scope of the
Labor Management Relations Act). Congress intended to preempt completely this area of the law;
therefore, the case was removable to federal court, and jurisdiction rested with the federal court even
if the federal question did not appear on the face on the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. The
Supreme Court has emphasized that the scope of ERISA preemption is to be interpreted with
reference to preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S.
at 64-66; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-57 (1987); Rice, 65 F.3d at 637.
236. lass, 88 F.3d at 1487.
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subject matter jurisdiction.131 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,
the Supreme Court applied the "complete preemption" exception to the "well-
pleaded complaint rule" in ERISA cases.2 3  The Supreme Court stated that
the doctrine of "complete preemption" applied due to the congressional intent
"to make all suits that are cognizable under ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions federal question suits."239
Furthermore, once "complete preemption" is recognized under ERISA, the
plaintiff's complaint is recharacterized as a complaint arising under federal law,
and the injured plaintiff is restricted to the remedies provided within
ERISA. 2' The remedies available under ERISA are essentially the recovery
of any benefits due under the plan, or injunctive or declaratory relief to obtain
or clarify benefits. 4' Obviously, if a plaintiff were limited to the remedies
available in ERISA, a severely injured plaintiff would not receive adequate
compensation or would be left without a remedy. However, the Supreme Court
has ruled that Congress intended the remedies provided within ERISA to be
exclusive,2 42 even if an individual is left without a remedy.2 43 The Supreme
Court has stated, "The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free
237. The term "complete preemption" is misleading because complete preemption does not
really deal with preemption; rather, it is a doctrine of federal jurisdiction. Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d
941, 943 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989). As one commentator has noted:
"Complete" preemption . . . is a removal jurisdiction doctrine which divests a state
court ofjurisdiction by recharacterizing otherwise valid state-law claims (in areas subject
to the doctrine) as "necessarily federal in character." In such cases,
preemption-normally a federal defense-loses that character and causes the federal
question to inhere in the complaint.
Dennis W. Arrow, Federal Question Doctrines and American Indian Law, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 263, 319-20 (1989) (quoting Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63-64) (emphasis original).
238. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
239. Id. at 63-64.
240. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1487 (7th Cir. 1996).
241. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B). ERISA provides that a participant in a plan or beneficiary
may bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan." Id. For cases in which the plaintiff sought injunctive relief or recovery of benefits due under
a benefit plan, see, e.g., Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 920 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia, 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Virginia 1990); Cole
v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1990); Rollo v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of New Jersey, Civ.A. No. 90-597, 1990 WL 312647 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990);
Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131 (D.N.J. 1989). See also Julia Field Costich,
Denial of Coverage for "Experimental" Medical Procedures: The Problem of De Novo Review
Under ERISA, 79 Ky. L.J. 801 (1991).
242. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
243. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995); Spain v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1993).
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to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA." 2"
It is an unclear question whether Congress ever intended ERISA to preempt
causes of actions based on state tort law. One commentator has noted that
"[t]here is no indication in the language of ERISA's preemption clause, or in
ERISA's legislative history, that employers and benefit plans were to obtain
some self-promoting protection from state law obligations."2 45  However, the
federal courts are divided on whether ERISA preempts medical negligence
causes of actions against employer-sponsored HMOs.2 46  The Supreme Court
has declined to resolve the controversy2 47 in what has been described as a
"most shocking abdication of judicial law-creating authority by the Supreme
Court," resulting in a "zone of no liability for negligent acts." 24'
B. The Ambiguity of ERISA's "Relates to" Clause
A cause of action founded in state law "relates to" a benefit plan if the
"operation of the law impinges on the functioning of an ERISA plan" or if the
"state law in its application directly relates to the administration and
disbursement of ERISA plan benefits. ,2 49 In the context of an injured plaintiff
suing an HMO for medical negligence either under a theory of vicarious liability
or corporate or direct liability (for example, its failure to use reasonable care in
a prospective utilization review process), some federal courts have held that the
state cause of action "relates to" the benefit plan and thus is preempted.'o
244. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
245. Pittman, supra note 8, at 360.
246. Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 825 (D. Md. 1995). See authorities collected
supra note 11.
247. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1045 (1994); Corcoran v. United Healthcare Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
248. Pittman, supra note 8, at 356-57.
249. Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993). A law relates to an
employee benefit plan if the law has a "connection with or reference to such a plan." Pacificare of
Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1995). The Tenth Circuit has held that
four categories of laws "relate to" benefit plans:
First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans. Second. laws that
create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements for ERISA plans. Third,
laws that provide rules for the calculation of the amount of benefits to be paid under
ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and common-law rules that provide remedies for
misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA plan.
Id. at 154.
250. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995) (alleging corporate
negligence in utilization review); Spain, 11 F.3d at 129 (alleging corporate negligence in refusing
to authorize bone marrow transplant); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 298 (applying preemption to corporate
negligence); Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321 (alleging corporate negligence in the denial of
hospitalization for pregnant woman); Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D.
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Under this line of authority, the same rationale applies whether "the claim is for
the HMO's own negligence or is being asserted against the HMO on the theory
of vicarious liability. "" Four primary reasons are given in support of
preemption. First, any ostensible agency claim and any claim regarding the
quality of treatment actually received must be measured against what the benefit
plan provided; therefore, such claims relate to the benefit plan. 2 Second,
any claim based on ostensible or apparent agency will involve inquiry into
representations that the plan made to determine if the HMO held out the
physician as an ostensible agent. As one court reasoned, "[a] claim based on
such references, descriptions, or explanations is 'related to' the benefit plan.
Matters relating to a benefit plan are pre-empted by ERISA."2' Third, HMO
enrollees are assured of a certain quantity and quality of medical services. A
malpractice claim alleging vicarious or direct liability against an HMO "asserts
the services provided did not measure up to the benefit plan's promised quality.
The question is one of relating plan performance to plan-promise, and is
therefore pre-empted by ERISA. "' Fourth, higher costs in benefit plans will
result if liability were imposed, and some courts are reluctant to adopt such
"potentially widesweeping policy." Some courts believe that Congress, not the
courts, should properly re-examine the scope of ERISA preemption to determine
if malpractice liability should be allowed. 5
The courts that have held that ERISA preempts malpractice claims alleging
vicarious liability and direct corporate liability are giving an indiscriminate, all-
inclusive, and sweeping interpretation to ERISA's "relates to" language. Such
a broad or expansive interpretation acts as a judicial grant of immunity from tort
liability to HMOs. 6 However, only federal district courts, not federal courts
of appeal, have interpreted ERISA so broadly or all-inclusively to preempt both
Md. 1994) (applying ERISA preemption to vicarious liability claims); Visconti v. U.S. Health Care,
857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding ERISA preemption applies to vicarious liability claims);
Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994) (applying ERISA preemption to vicarious liability
claims); Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (drawing
no distinction between corporate negligence and vicarious liability for ERISA preemption); Nealy
v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying ERISA preemption to
vicarious liability claim); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding vicarious
liability claim preempted by ERISA).
251. Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 42, rev'd, 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995). cert. denied, 16 S. Ct.
564 (1995).
252. See Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 42.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 43.
256. See authorities collected supra note 240.
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vicarious liability and corporate liability causes of action. 7  These lower
court decisions have relied predominately on two legal precedents. The first
precedent involves two federal district court cases-Dukes v. United States
Health Care Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc. 258 and Visconti v. U.S. Health
Care."59 However, the Third Circuit reversed both Dukes and Visconti on
appeal. 2' The Third Circuit specifically held that ERISA preemption did not
apply to claims challenging the "quality" of care provided; rather, ERISA only
preempted cases attacking the "quantity" of benefits provided.", Arguably,
the Third Circuit's reversal of Dukes and Visconti undermines the credibility of
the line of decision that have preempted both vicarious and corporate liability
causes of action against HMOs.
The second precedent is found in the Fifth Circuit case Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc.262 In this case, the court held that ERISA preempted a state
tort action against an employer-sponsored HMO because the action "related to"
the benefit plan.2 63 However, in the Corcoran case, the plaintiff's allegations
were premised upon corporate liability principles, claiming that the HMO was
negligent in its prospective utilization review when it required in-home care and
denied the physician's request to hospitalize the woman who was experiencing
complications in her pregnancy which resulted in her baby's death . 21
Corcoran lends little support for a broad or expansive interpretation of ERISA's
.relates to" language because the court's holding should have application only
to cases involving corporate liability because Corcoran did not address the
possibility of vicarious liability under ERISA. Factually, the case involved only
corporate negligence, not vicarious liability. 21 This line of authority from
federal district courts, holding that ERISA preempts all tort cases against
employer-sponsored HMOs, including those based on a theory of vicarious
257. Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1994) (applying
ERISA preemption to vicarious liability claims); Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding ERISA preemption applies to vicarious liability claims); Butler v. Wu, 853
F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994) (applying ERISA preemption to vicarious liability claims); Dukes v.
United States Health Care Sys. Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (drawing no distinction
between corporate negligence and vicarious liability for ERISA preemption); Nealy v. U.S.
Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying ERISA preemption to vicarious
liability claim); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding vicarious liability
claim preempted by ERISA).
258. 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
259. 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
260. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995).
261. Id. at 356-58.
262. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
263. Id. at 1331.
264. Id. at 1322-24.
265. Id.
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liability, is currently a minority view. 2' The decided trend in the law is to
give a narrow, discerning interpretation to ERISA's "relates to" language and
to confine ERISA preemption to cases founded upon allegations of corporate
liability, but not allegations of vicarious liability .267
Unfortunately, courts often fail to note this distinction when ruling on the
preemption issue. Thus, the federal appellate courts that have held that ERISA
preemption applies to medical negligence actions were reviewing cases involving
the application of corporate liability principles. In all of the cases, the federal
courts of appeals considered cases alleging the denial of medical treatment or
hospitalization, i.e., negligence in the utilization review process, a form of
corporate negligence. 2" These decisions did not specifically address whether
ERISA would preempt vicarious liability causes of action against HMs.26 9
A court could easily determine that a claim of corporate negligence, alleging
improper denial of benefits, "relates to" the administration of employee benefits
266. See supra note 257.
267. For cases that have specifically held that ERISA preempts corporate negligence claims,
but not claims based upon vicarious liability, see Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995),
rev'g, 875 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. II1. 1994); Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151
(10th Cir. 1995); Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995); Jackson v. Roseman,
878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994);
Kearney v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Burke v. Smithkline Bio-
Science Laboratories, 858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Stroker v. Rubin, Civ.A. No. 94-5563,
1994 WL 719694 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1994); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of
Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992). For cases holding that ERISA did not
preempt a state tort claim, even though they factually dealt with vicarious liability, see Prudential
Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Lewis, 177 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996); Jackson v.
Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Kusznir v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., No. 95-C-1325, 1995
WL 404860 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.
I11. 1994); Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes,
852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa.
1990); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). See also Conrad & Seiter, supra
note 6, at 199; Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 61-64.
268. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1485 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying
plan coverage of physical therapy to patient after knee surgery which resulted in premature discharge
from the hospital); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 939 (6th Cir. 1995) (declining
in-patient psychiatric treatment under the plan); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 130 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding plan refused bone marrow transplant); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan Inc.,
999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding plan failed to precertify heart surgery); Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plan allowed home
care for complications during pregnancy, not hospitalization).
269. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1485 (denying plan coverage of physical therapy to patient after knee
surgery which resulted in premature discharge from the hospital); Tolton, 48 F.3d at 939 (declining
in-patient psychiatric treatment under the plan); Spain, I 1 F.3d at 130 (holding plan refused bone
marrow transplant); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 300 (holding plan failed to precertify heart surgery);
Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324 (holding that the plan allowed home care for complications during
pregnancy, not hospitalization).
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or the amount of benefits provided by a benefit plan and, therefore, is
preempted under ERISA. A court could easily perceive a claim of corporate
negligence (failure to use reasonable care in the supervision of participating
physicians, in the selection or retention of physicians, in the implementation of
utilization review or cost-containment incentives) as a direct challenge to the
administration of the employee benefit plan and would be justified in concluding
that ERISA would preempt such a claim.
Some courts have specifically distinguished between claims of corporate
liability and vicarious liability. This line of decisions provides a discerning
interpretation of ERISA's "relates to" language as applied to medical negligence
causes of action against employer-sponsored HMOs. Under this narrow
interpretation, the "relates to" language is applied to preempt allegations of
corporate negligence but not allegations of vicarious liability. 70 The federal
courts that have held that ERISA does not preempt medical negligence causes
of action have all dealt with claims based on vicarious liability, even though
these courts have not clearly articulated the distinction between direct liability
and vicarious liability. 271
Only federal district courts, not federal appellate courts, are in
disagreement. The district courts are divided as to whether ERISA preempts
vicarious liability causes of action against employer-sponsored HMOs, but the
clear trend is not to allow preemption. 2 Furthermore, the federal appellate
270. For cases holding that ERISA preempted corporate negligence claims, but not claims based
upon vicarious liability, see supra note 267.
271. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Lewis, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996); Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md.
1996); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Kusznir v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
No. 95-C-1325, 1995 WL 404860 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875
F. Supp. 544 (S.D. 111. 1994); Patemo v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Smith v.
HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F.
Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The author
is aware of only one decision that has held that ERISA did not preempt a claim of corporate
negligence. This case was rendered by a Pennsylvania court, not a federal court. Pappas v. Asbel,
675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). However, this case also contained allegations that the treating
physician was negligent so it is possible the court did not understand the distinction. Id.
272. For cases that have held that ERISA preemption applies to claims based on vicarious
liability, see Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1994); Visconti
v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Penn. 1994), rev'd 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995);
Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1994); Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys., Inc., 848
F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO,
844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D. N.J. 1993). For
cases specifically holding that ERISA preempts corporate negligence claims, but not claims based
upon vicarious liability, see Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'g, 875 F. Supp. 471
(N.D. 111. 1994); Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995);
Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820
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courts that have specifically ruled on whether ERISA preempts state tort claims
based on vicarious liability have agreed that ERISA does not preempt this form
of state claim.2" The federal appellate courts are in agreement that ERISA
preempts claims of corporate negligence against HMOs because the failure to
use reasonable care in the utilization review process "relates to" the benefit
plan.
274
The disagreement results partly from confusion as to the appropriate level
of generality that courts should use when interpreting ERISA's "relates to"
language and whether to take a broad, all-inclusive approach or a narrow
discerning approach in interpreting the language. The disagreement also stems
from the failure of federal appellate courts to clearly distinguish between
corporate or direct liability and vicarious liability in rendering decisions in cases
involving corporate liability. In these cases, the federal appellate courts held
that ERISA preemption applied to the causes of action, but these cases factually
involved arguments regarding corporate negligence and did not address whether
a different result would be reached in the case of vicarious liability.27 Thus,
(D. Md. 1995); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Kearney v. U.S.
HealthCare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Burke v. Smithkline Bio-Science Laboratories,
858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Stroker v. Rubin, Civ.A. No. 94-5563, 1994 WL 719694
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1994); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med.,
802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992). For cases holding that ERISA did not preempt state tort claim,
but factually dealing with allegations of vicarious liability, see Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v.
Lewis, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995);
Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D.
Md. 1995); Kusznir v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., No. 95-C-1325, 1995 WL 404860 (N.D. Ill. May 31,
1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. 111. 1994); Patero v. Atbuerne,
855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill.
1994); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990); DeGenova v. Ansel,
555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). See also Conrad & Seiter, supra note 6, at 199; Perdue &
Baxley, supra note 6, at 61-64.
273. See Burrage, 59 F.3d at 151; Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350.
274. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying ERISA
preemption to case where recovery was sought for the plan's denial of physical therapy following
knee surgery and for premature release from the hospital); Burrage, 59 F.3d at 151 (applying ERISA
preemption to corporate negligence, but not vicarious liability); Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356 (holding
ERISA preempts claims challenging the "quantity of benefits" provided, not "quality" of provided
benefits); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995) (declining in-patient
psychiatric treatment under the plan); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding plan refused bone marrow transplant); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan Inc., 999 F.2d
298 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding plan failed to precertify heart surgery); Corcoran v. United Healthcare,
Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (plan allowed home care for complications during pregnancy,
not hospitalization).
275. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1482 (applying ERISA preemption to a case where recovery was sought
for the plan's denial of physical therapy following knee surgery and the resulting premature release
from the hospital); Tolton, 48 F.3d at 937 (declining in-patient psychiatric treatment under the plan);
Spain, 11 F.3d at 129 (stating plan refused bone marrow transplant); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 298 (holding
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the emerging standard regarding ERISA preemption involves corporate liability
cases, but not vicarious liability. 6 It has been argued that "[i]f ERISA was
interpreted to preempt all claims that affect an HMO . . . , such as vicarious
liability claims under appropriate circumstances, then HMOs would have a
unique status in the law. HMOs would enjoy a charmed existence that was
never contemplated by Congress."'
C. Vicarious Liability Claims Avoid ERISA Preemption
Although "[it is undisputed that ERISA preempts claims which arise from
the manner in which an HMO administered plan benefits or which derive from
the type or extent of benefits the ... HMO promised or provided, "278 federal
courts have advanced various policy arguments in support of their conclusion
that preemption does not apply to claims founded upon vicarious liability.
ERISA does not preempt state laws of general application and laws involving
areas of traditional state regulation.279 Accordingly, a malpractice claim
would not be preempted because it is based on a law of general application, one
that neither targets ERISA plans nor "affect[s] the structure, administration, or
benefits provided by the plan." 280 A malpractice claim is "too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral . . . to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the
plan."28 The mere fact that the tort litigation would have "some economic
impact" on the plan, such as having to pay a judgment, does not require that the
law be preempted. 28 A tort cause of action under state law can be
characterized as a "run-of-the-mill" state law claim and, according to the
Supreme Court, should not fall victim to the ERISA preemption clause.2"
Furthermore, a cause of action against an HMO that seeks to impose
vicarious liability on the HMO for the negligence of an employee-physician or
an ostensible or apparent agent is an action to recover for personal injuries, not
plan failed to precertify needed heart surgery); Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321 (holding plan allowed
home care for complications during pregnancy, not hospitalization).
276. Conrad & Seiter, supra note 6, at 199; Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 60-64.
277. Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6, at 63-64.
278. Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995).
279. Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting
National Elevation Indus. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1558-59 (10th Cir. 1992)).
280. See Burrage, 59 F.3d at 154.
281. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)). See also Smith
v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 672 (N.D. II1. 1994).
282. Burrage, 59 F.3d at 154.
283. Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (citing
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825 (1988)).
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to challenge the denial of any rights under the plan.2 The court would not
have to refer to the benefit plan in order to determine whether the physician was
negligent and to impose vicarious liability upon the HMO. Rather, the court
would examine the evidence to determine what happened and whether the
physician acted negligently in providing treatment admittedly covered under the
plan.2  While ERISA would preempt a claim that a patient did not receive
a promised benefit under the plan,2" ERISA would not preempt a claim that
a patient "received promised service from a provider who performed that service
negligently. . . .. 28 One court stated the argument as follows:
The plaintiffs are not attempting to define new "rights under the terms
of the plan"; instead, they are attempting to assert their already-
existing rights under the generally-applicable state law of agency and
tort. . . . [Platients enjoy the right to be free from medical
malpractice regardless of whether or not their medical care is provided
through an ERISA plan.2"
Just as ERISA does not preempt a malpractice claim against a physician in his
individual capacity, ERISA should not preempt causes of action under a theory
of vicarious liability when the HMO employed the physician or when the HMO
"holds out" the physician as its agent. 2 9 A simple reference to a benefit plan
in a state tort action in order to resolve an agency issue should not "sufficiently
relate to the plan so as to warrant preemption. 290
Moreover, Congress intended, in preempting state law, to secure uniform
laws regulating employee benefit plans. The "preemption of state common law
claims which are not premised on a violation of duties imposed by ERISA"
would not promote that intended goal. 29 ' A state medical malpractice action
would not interfere with or alter Congress' carefully-crafted statutory
scheme.2 92 ERISA's legislative history does not evidence any congressional
intent to provide under ERISA a remedy for medical malpractice, and
284. Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 672 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citing Elsesser v.
Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa.
1992)); Independence HMO, 733 F. Supp. at 988.
285. Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Md. 1995).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1995).
289. Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995).
290. Id. at 154-55.
291. Independence HMO, Inc., v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 988 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting
Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Action Mfg. Co., 697 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1988)).
292. Independence HMO, 733 F. Supp. at 988; Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669,
672 (N.D. I11. 1994).
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congressional silence may suggest that Congress intended not to preempt
malpractice actions against HMOs founded on state tort law.293 Preemption
would lead to the "anomalous result" of an "unwise federalization of an entire
class of state tort claims which, absent diversity, would be decided in state
court." 2" Furthermore, courts are reluctant to preempt an area of traditional
state law without clear evidence of congressional intent to do so.2' 9
The better-reasoned decisions support the proposition that ERISA
preemption does not apply to claims under state law based on a theory of
vicarious liability. However, a unique decision by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals adds to the confusion as to permissible state tort actions. Instead of
drawing the line between permissible state claims and those preempted by
ERISA with the vicarious liability/corporate liability distinction, the Third
Circuit in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc."9 distinguished between claims that
challenge the "quality" of benefits provided by the plan and claims that
challenge the "quantity" of benefits provided."9 In Dukes, the plaintiff
claimed that an HMO was vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician
who was allegedly an ostensible agent of the HMO. The plaintiff also argued
a theory of corporate negligence, alleging that the HMO was negligent in
selecting, retaining, and monitoring the physician. 98 The Third Circuit held
293. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
294. Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Md. 1995) (quoting Page v. Heeman,
No. 93-372, at 2 (D. Md. 1993)).
295. Smith, 852 F. Supp. at 672.
296. 57 F.3d 350 (3d. Cir. 1995), rev'g, 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994), and rev'g, Visconti
v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
297. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357, accord Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996) In
Prihoda, the court found that the physician misdiagnoised a kidney tumor which permitted the tumor
to metastasize to the lung of the patient. The court held that the alleged negligence dealt only with
the quality of the benefits provided, not the denial or withholding of benefits under the plan, and as
such ERISA did not preempt the cause of action against the plan for the vicarious liability of the
physician, and the suit was allow to proceed. Prihoda, 914 F. Supp. at 133. Many times the same
result would be obtained by drawing the line between permissible and impermissible claims using
a "quality/quantity" distinction or a corporate liability/vicarious liability distinction in determining
whether ERISA preempted the claims. Claims challenging the plan's "quality" of care would
typically involve claims based upon physician neglect in selecting or performing treatment and would
usually allege the plan's vicarious liability for the treating physician's negligence. Causes of action
alleging corporate negligence many times challenge the "quantity" of benefits provided (i.e., the
plan's failure to provide coverage for certain modes of treatment), especially allegations of
negligence in prospective utilization review. Therefore, the preemption issue would likely be
resolved the same whether approached from a "quality/quantity" or corporate liability/vicarious
liability standpoint. However, as Dukes pointed out, the "distinction between the quantity of benefits
due under a welfare plan and the quality of those benefits will not always be clear . . . ." Dukes,
57 F.3d at 358. A clearer, easier line distinguishes between allegations of vicarious liability and
corporate liability, and thus ERISA would not preempt claims of vicarious liability but would
preempt claims of corporate negligence.
298. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352.
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that ERISA preempted causes of action claiming injury from the HMO's
withholding of "some quantum of plan benefits due." 2  Congress did not
intend ERISA to regulate the "quality of benefits received by plan
participants."" The Third Circuit was "confident that a claim about the
quality of a benefit received is not a claim under [ERISA] to recover benefits
due . . . under the terms of [the] plan.""° The Third Circuit acknowledged
that distinguishing between quantity and quality might not be easy in all cases:
We recognize that the distinction between the quantity of benefits
due under a welfare plan and the quality of those benefits will not
always be clear in situations like this where the benefit contracted for
is health care services rather than money to pay for such services.
There well may be cases in which the quality of a patient's medical
care or the skills of the personnel provided to administer that care will
be so low that the treatment received simply will not qualify as health
care at all. In such a case, it well may be appropriate to conclude that
the plan participant or beneficiary has been denied benefits due under
the plan. This is not such a case, however.'
Accordingly, the Third Circuit remanded the case to state court for resolution
under both vicarious liability and corporate liability theories.'
The Third Circuit made clear that a case alleging corporate negligence in
utilization review would challenge the "quantity" of benefits, would "relate to"
the benefit plan, and, as such, would be subject to ERISA preemption.' 4 In
Dukes, the plaintiff alleged corporate negligence for the HMO's failure to use
reasonable care in the selection, retention, and monitoring of participating
physicians,3 not a failure to use reasonable care in utilization review.'
Two possible explanations exist as to why the Third Circuit did not conclude
that ERISA preempted this type of corporate negligence cause of action and why
the court also remanded this portion of the case. First, the Third Circuit
believed that an HMO's failure to use reasonable care in selecting and
299. Id. at 357.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358. This approach would lead to the rather peculiar result- as the
quality of care drastically declined, an injured patient would be less likely to have a state tort cause
of action in medical malpractice against the HMO because ERISA would more likely preempt the
claim as a determination regarding the quantity of benefits due under a plan.
303. Id. at 361.
304. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 360-61 (citing Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th
Cir. 1992)).
305. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352.
306. Id. at 361.
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supervising physicians involved a "quality," not a "quantity," issue. However,
such an allegation of corporate negligence clearly would affect the structure or
administration of the benefit plan,' could arguably directly "relate to" the
benefit plan, and thus would be subject to ERISA preemption. Furthermore, an
HMO's failure to properly screen or monitor physicians could, in certain fact
situations, result in a physician's negligent failure to provide certain treatments,
not merely the negligent administration of provided care, which would then
clearly fall within the purview of the "quantity" of benefits provided. It is
unclear whether courts will follow the Third Circuit and allow certain forms of
corporate negligence claims to proceed, but recognize ERISA preemption of
other corporate negligence claims, most noticeably negligence in utilization
review.
A second explanation as to why the Third Circuit remanded the corporate
negligence claim is simply that it was too intertwined with the vicarious liability
claim. The court may have considered it impossible to separate the two
allegations because the court lacked complete understanding of the plan's
benefits and the participants' rights because the case was on appeal from orders
granting motions to dismiss.' Furthermore, the Third Circuit left "open for
resolution by the state courts the issue of whether the plaintiffs' claims are
preempted under [section] 514(a). " 309 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit clearly
held that preemption does not apply to vicarious liability claims under its
"quality/quantity" distinction.310 However, it is not so clear that the Dukes
opinion sets a precedent for the proposition that ERISA might not preempt
certain claims of corporate liability.
D. Vicarious Liability Versus Corporate Liability
Various arguments can be made that ERISA should not preempt either type
of state tort claim:
First, state medical malpractice claims are based upon laws of general
applicability which generally will affect the benefit plan in a too
tenuous, remote, and peripheral manner. Second, even if the same
negligent act may give rise to a cause of action for both a state
malpractice claim and for a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, the
state malpractice claim should not be preempted when it is based on
liability theories outside of those covered under ERISA. There is no
indication from the language, or from the legislative history, of ERISA
307. Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (1995).
308. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356.
309. Id. at 361.
310. Id. at 357.
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that Congress' intent in enacting ERISA is to "eviscerate all state laws
that touch on employee benefits." Third, the public polidy reason that
has been cited by the Supreme Court to support preemption of state
laws is based upon an outdated rationale that should not be followed
in the future.3 '
This outmoded rationale was that the individual variations of laws among the
states "would produce considerable inefficiencies, which the employer might
choose to offset by lowering benefit levels."
31 2
311. Pittman, supra note 8, at 426-27 (citations omitted).
312. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Fort
Halifax Packing Company, Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987)). A practical argument could be
made that ERISA should not preempt either claims of corporate liability or vicarious liability. A
case alleging corporate liability (e.g., a failure to use reasonable care in selecting or retaining staff,
in monitoring physician performance, in utilization review, or in implementing or designing cost-
containment incentives) ultimately suggests that an individual within the corporation made a negligent
decision. Therefore, a litigant could attempt to avoid ERISA preemption, in a case involving
allegations of corporate negligence, by phrasing the complaint in terms of the negligence of the
individual and couching the terms of relief in terms of vicarious liability. For example, a plaintiff
injured by prospective utilization review could attempt to sue the medical director who denied the
requested treatment, allege that the HMO was vicariously liable for the medical director's
negligence, and attempt to avoid ERISA preemption of the corporate negligence claim for failure
to use reasonable care in utilization review. However, artful pleading does not avoid complete
preemption. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh
Circuit held:
[A] federal court may, in some situations, look beyond the face of the complaint to
determine whether a plaintiff has artfully pleaded his suit so as to couch a federal claim
in terms of state law. . . . Such a situation exists where . . . federal law displaces an
area of state law and the plaintiff frames her complaint in such a way as to avoid the
appearance of complete preemption.
Id. at 1488-89. In Jass, the plaintiff underwent knee replacement surgery, and she claimed that "her
condition required a course of physical therapy to rehabilitate her knee." Id. at 1485. A nurse
administering the utilization review of the plan decided it was not necessary, and "as a result Jass
was prematurely discharged from the hospital without the necessary rehabilitation" causing injury
to her knee. Id. Jass argued that the plan was vicariously liable for the nurse's actions in denying
the rehabilitation and for her physician's failure to treat. Id. The court held that the plaintiff had
artfully pled her complaint to avoid ERISA preemption. Id. at 1489. Clearly, the court was looking
beyond the complaint itself because the vicarious liability claim rested upon a determination of the
benefits due under the plan and thus was clearly subject to ERISA preemption. Id. This claim,
actually a claim of corporate negligence (negligence in utilization review), was clearly subject to
ERISA, and deceptive allegations should not have avoided this. Id. "Jass' negligence claim against
Margulis [the nurse], a utilization review administrator for the plan, is properly recharacterized as
a claim arising under federal law." Id. at 1490. The vicarious liability claim, premised upon the
treating physician's negligence, was based upon the claim that the physician did not provide the
needed rehabilitation, not that the services were preformed negligently. Id. at 1493. Thus, the
doctor's "failure to treat stemmed from Margulis' denial of benefits based on her conclusion, as
PruCare's utilization review administrator, that treatment was unnecessary." Id. at 1492. The
plaintiff, through artful pleading, attempted to reclassify the corporate negligence cause of action as
a vicarious liability cause of action in order to avoid ERISA preemption. Id. at 1489. Accordingly,
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Larry J. Pittman has suggested that the Supreme Court should interpret
ERISA to allow corporate negligence claims or at least should create a cause of
action for beneficiaries under ERISA plans who are injured through corporate
negligence so that they may recover compensatory damages.313 He has argued
that "[a] claim for compensatory damages will serve as a deterrence mechanism
and a counter balance to negligent decision-making by a benefit plan or an
independent utilization reviewer as they attempt to cut health care costs.
Creation of this remedy accords with ERISA's legislative history."3"4 This
argument that ERISA should not preempt corporate negligence causes of action
has merit; however, the Supreme Court might not necessarily agree.
Arguably, no split in the federal appellate courts exists regarding ERISA
preemption of malpractice claims. The circuit courts that have specifically
addressed this issue have agreed that ERISA does not preempt vicarious liability
claims,315 but does preempt corporate liability claims."a 6 The disagreement
occurs at the district court level over ERISA preemption of causes of action
founded upon vicarious liability.317 The disagreement at the federal district
the court applied the doctrine of complete preemption. Id. at 1491. The court distinguished Jass
from other cases in which ERISA was held not to preempt causes of action alleging the vicarious
liability of HMOs for the negligence of treating physician's. Id. at 1443. The physician's alleged
negligence was "intertwined with the benefits determination because the alleged negligence
concerned a failure to treat where the Plan denied payment for the treatment." Id. at 1494.
Attempting to avoid complete preemption through artful pleading can have severe ramifications. As
the court stated, "[A]rtful pleading of an ERISA case to avoid federal jurisdiction may result in
dismissal, without an opportunity to amend." Id. at 1491.
313. Pittman, supra note 8, at 441.
314. Id.
315. Prudential Health Care Plan Inc. v. Lewis, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996); Pacificare of
Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d
350 (3d Cir. 1995).
316. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Rice v. Panchel,
65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'g, 875 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. I11. 1994); Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 151
(applying ERISA preemption to corporate negligence claims, but not vicarious liability claims);
Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350 (holding ERISA preempts claims challenging the "quantity of benefits"
provided, not "quality" of provided benefits); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th
Cir. 1995) (declining in-patient psychiatric treatment under the plan); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
I1 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding plan refused bone marrow transplant); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l
Health Plan Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating plan failed to precertify needed heart
surgery); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding plan allowed
home care for complications during pregnancy, not hospitalization).
317. For cases holding that ERISA preemption applies to claims based on vicarious liability,
see Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1994); Visconti v. United
States Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Penn. 1994), rev'd, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995);
Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 1994); Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys. Inc., 848
F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO,
U.S. 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993).
For cases specifically holding that ERISA preempts corporate negligence claims, but not claims
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court level, but not at the appellate level, may explain why the Supreme Court
has exercised judicial restraint in this area of the law.
Furthermore, as far as ERISA preemption is concerned, decisions already
rendered by the Supreme Court seem consistent with a distinction between state
tort claims based on corporate liability and those based on vicarious liability.
In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux3t 8
that ERISA preempts a state tort cause of action for the bad faith processing of
a claim for ERISA benefits."' Litigants brought bad faith claims under a fee-
for-service approach when a benefit plan refused to pay a medical bill after
services were rendered, retrospective review. Prospective utilization review
performs much the same function, but it denies coverage before treatment is
rendered.32 With regard to ERISA preemption, little difference is evident
between bad faith and corporate negligence claims based on failure to use
reasonable care in utilization review. The Supreme Court is likely to follow the
precedent established in Pilot Life and conclude that ERISA preempts causes of
action alleging corporate negligence.
However, "other Supreme Court decisions warn against extending Pilot Life
to preempt state claims for medical malpractice,"32 especially those that base
liability upon vicarious liability principles. In 1988, the Supreme Court stated
in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc. :
ERISA plans may be sued in a . . . civil action .... These
cases-lawsuits against ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state-law
claims such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts
based upon vicarious liability, see Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 151; Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F.
Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Dearmas v. Av-
Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Kearney v. U.S. HealthCare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182
(E.D. Pa. 1994); Burke v. Smithkline Bio-Science Laboratories, 858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Stroker v. Rubin, Civ.A. No. 94-5563, 1994 WL 719694 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1994); Elsesser
v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
For cases holding that ERISA does not preempt some state tort claims, but factually involving
allegations of vicarious liability, see Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350; Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113
(D. Md. 1996); Jackson, 878 F. Supp. at 820; Kusznir v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., No. 95-C-1325,
1995 WL 404860 (N.D. I11. May 31, 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544
(S.D. Ill. 1994); Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Smith v. HMO Great
Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983
(E.D. Pa. 1990); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). See also Conrad &
Seiter, supra note 6, at 199; Perdue & Baxley, supra note 6. at 61-64.
318. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
319. Id.
320. Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
321. Pittman, supra note 8, at 388.
322. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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committed by an ERISA plan-are relatively commonplace. Petitioners
and the United States (appearing here as amicus curiae) concede that
these suits, although obviously affecting and involving ERISA plans
and their trustees, are not pre-empted by ERISA ..
Claims that seek to impose vicarious liability on HMOs would appear to be such
"run-of-the-mill state-law claims" and would thus fall within the Mackey
description of permissible actions under state law. On the other hand,
allegations of corporate negligence would still be perceived as challenges to the
administration of benefit plans, would "relate to" benefit plans, and accordingly
would be preempted by ERISA.
Furthermore, the scope of the terms "relates to" a benefit plan was
restricted by the 1995 Supreme Court decision of New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.324 The Court
observed that were the phrase "relates to" given a literal interpretation, ERISA
preemption would never stop because "relations stop nowhere. " 3 s "Infinite
relations cannot be the measure of preemption" ;326 rather, the extent of ERISA
preemption should be measured by what state law "Congress understood would
survive."327 The Supreme Court clearly held that ERISA should not preempt
a state law simply because the state law has an indirect economic influence on
the price of a benefit plan:328
In sum, cost-uniformity was almost certainly not an object of pre-
emption, just as laws with only an indirect economic effect on the
relative costs of various health insurance packages in a given State are
a far cry from those "conflicting directives" from which Congress
meant to insulate ERISA plans. 32 9
The Supreme Court stated that "Congress could not possibly have intended to
eliminate" the myriad of state laws that indirectly impact the cost of benefits in
areas "traditionally subject to local regulation.""
323. Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
324. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
325. Id. at 1677.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1679. The Court noted that "[t]he basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was
to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of
employee benefit plans." Id. at 1677-78.
329. Id. at 1680.
330. 115 S. Ct. at 1683.
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Thus, the Supreme Court has given strong indication that ERISA should not
preempt causes of action against employer-sponsored HMOs alleging vicarious
liability and grounded in state law, although the law is less clear regarding
claims alleging corporate negligence. Arguably, the Supreme Court should
grant certiorari in an appropriate case in order to resolve the issue of ERISA
preemption in corporate negligence claims, and this author contends the Court
should allow this type of claim under state law. However, a congressional
solution would appear more appropriate.
A distinction between vicarious liability and corporate liability seems
appropriate for ERISA preemption purposes. Corporate liability claims relate
to the administration of benefit plans and should arguably be subject to ERISA
preemption. Furthermore, this distinction complies with a common-sense
understanding of the term "relates to" a benefit plan.33' In Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc. ,332 the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempts a state
cause of action for failure to use reasonable care in utilization review. The
court concluded that ERISA's preemption clause, as drafted by Congress, would
preclude the corporate negligence claim.333  However, the Fifth Circuit
identified three reasons why Congress should amend ERISA to allow state tort
actions for failure to use reasonable care in utilization review.
First, ERISA preemption "eliminates an important check on the thousands
of medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization review
system." 334  Without state tort liability, "substandard medical decision-
making" goes undeterred. 3 5  As a result, the cost of using reasonable care
will not be factored into the cost of doing business, and HMOs will have less
incentive to "deliver both high quality services and reasonable prices. "336
Second, ERISA should be amended to allow corporate negligence cases
because making compensatory damages available to the victim of negligent
utilization review "might ease the tension between the conflicting interests of the
beneficiary and the plan. " 33' The court noted that "some tension between the
interest of the beneficiary in obtaining quality medical care and the interest of
the plan in preserving the pool of funds available" for all beneficiaries has
always existed.338  Prospective utilization review exacerbates the tension
331. Pilot Life Ins. Co., v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).
332. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
333. Id. at 1332-34.




338. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992).
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because a patient is less likely to pursue an uncovered course of treatment. 39
The possibility of recovering damages for negligence might rectify to some
degree some of the harmful results of cost-saving approaches.
Third, Congress should re-examine ERISA because the "world of employee
benefit plans has hardly remained static since 1974" when Congress enacted
ERISA. 4  In 1974, prospective utilization review and cost-containment
incentives that HMOs utilize were not present to any degree. Thus,
"[flundamental changes such as the widespread institution of utilization review
would seem to warrant a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to serve
its noble purpose of safe-guarding the interests of employees. Our system, of
course, allocates this task to Congress, not the courts. " 4
VI. CONCLUSION
HMOs will continue to experience increased tort litigation.2' The
doctrine of vicarious liability is well established as a potential theory of
recovery, either vicarious liability claims against HMOs for the negligence of
employee-physicians 3 or claims regarding physicians who are the ostensible
or apparent agents of the HMO. 3' Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
imposing vicarious liability on an HMO will depend upon a finding that the
HMO exercised the requisite control over the details of the physician's work and
that an employer-employee relationship existed between the HMO and the
physician; 5 whereas, under the ostensible agency theory, vicarious liability
will require proof of sufficient implied representations from the surrounding
circumstances to establish that the HMO "held out" the physician as an
employee and that the patient was looking to the HMO to provide medical care,
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1338-39.
342. Reuben, supra note 1, at 55.
343. See, e.g., Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 876 F.2d
174 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. III. 1994); Pulvers
v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Sloan v. Metropolitan
Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Gugino v. Harvard
Community Health Plan, 403 N.E.2d 1166 (Mass. 1980); Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
344. See, e.g., Schleier, 876 F.2d at 174; Haas, 875 F. Supp. at 544; Kearney v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Independent HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F.
Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E. 2d 153 (I11. App. Ct. 1992);
Chase v. Independent Prac. Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991); Dunn, 606 A.2d
at 862; McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Boyd
v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); DeGenova, 555 A.2d at 147.
345. See, e.g., Raglin, 595 N.E.2d at 153; Sloan, 516 N.E.2d at 1104; Chase, 583 N.E.2d at
251.
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not just to the individual physician to provide treatment. 6 Whether the HMO
is a Staff, Group, Network, or IPA Model can affect a determination regarding
vicarious liability because, in these various models, the HMO exercises varying
degrees of control over physicians.'
Most litigation against HMOs seeks to make HMOs liable through vicarious
liability.' This may be the case because an allegation of vicarious liability,
unlike an allegation of corporate negligence, is less likely to be subject to
ERISA349 preemption3' when the HMO's coverage is part of an employee
benefit plan.3"' Although some federal district courts have held that ERISA
preempts vicarious liability claims, 352  the better-reasoned decisions, the
decisions of federal appellate courts, and the current trend in the law all appear
to suggest that ERISA does not preempt causes of action alleging vicarious
liability and that the claims should be allowed to proceed against employer-
sponsored HMOs.' s
346. See Kearney, 859 F. Supp. at 185; Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1234. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
347. See, e.g., Raglin, 595 N.E.2d at 153 (holding that evidence was not sufficient under the
facts to find an apparent agency with an IPA HMO); Chase, 583 N.E.2d at 251 (holding IPA HMO
not vicariously liable as an ostensible agent under the facts); Gugino, 403 N.E.2d at 1168-69
(imposing vicarious liability for an employee-physician in a Staff Model HMO); Boyd, 547 A.2d at
1229 (applying ostensible agency to an IPA Model HMO). See generally Cooper, supra note 1;
Kanute, supra note 4.
348. Cooper, supra note 1, at 1270.
349. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
350. Id. § 1144(a).
351. See, e.g., Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Lewis, 77 F.3d 493, 1996 WL 77018 (10th
Cir. 1996); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage,
59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995);
Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996); Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304
(D. Md. 1995); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan,
Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. I11. 1994); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla.
1994); Kearney v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Burke v.
Smithkline Bio-Science Lab., 858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F.
Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1994);
Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa.
1992); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990); DeGenova v. Ansel,
555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
352. See, e.g. Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs. Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1994);
Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125
(D.N.J. 1994); Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F.
Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993). Both Dukes and Visconti were overruled. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
353. See, e.g., Lewis, 77 F.3d at 493; Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350; Burrage, 59 F.3d at 151; Rice
v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'g, 875 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Iil. 1994); Prihoda, 914
F. Supp. at 113; Chaghervand, 909 F. Supp. at 304; Jackson, 878 F. Supp. at 820; Haas, 875 F.
Supp. at 544; Burke, 858 F. Supp. at 1181; Dearmas, 865 F. Supp. at 816; Kearney, 859 F. Supp.
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The boundaries of the tort liability of HMOs under the theory of corporate
or direct liability are beginning to emerge. Like hospitals,354 HMOs may
become subject to the duty to use reasonable care in monitoring physicians
during the treatment of patients3s5 and the duty to use reasonable care in
selecting and retaining participating physicians.356 Because enrollees have
limited choice regarding their treating physicians and rely on the HMO's
credentialing process and its representations regarding the quality of their
physicians, the law should impose liability on HMOs in order to protect
enrollees. Such liability would ensure that HMOs properly monitor the care
enrollees receive and the treatment physicians provide. 357
A patient who is negligently injured will likely sue the treating physician
and the HMO. A patient is likely to sue both when the improper care results
from a failure to order diagnostic tests, a failure to refer to a specialist, a failure
to hospitalize, or a failure to authorize expensive treatments and when cost-
containment incentives38 or a failure to use reasonable care in utilization
review 35 9 are a substantial factor or contributing cause31 in the physician's
failure to use the care that other reasonably competent physicians would have
used in the same or similar circumstances. 3"1 The cost-containment incentives
employed by the HMO create a conflict of interest between physicians and
patients because physicians earn less when more tests, procedures, referrals, or
hospitalizations are ordered for patient care.362 A physician's foreseeable
negligence should not be an intervening or superseding cause that cuts off the
liability of the HMO, especially when the HMO's cost-containment incentives
contributed to the physician's negligent conduct.3" Likewise, a physician's
at 182; Paterno, 855 F. Supp. at 1263; HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. at 669; Elsesser, 802 F.
Supp. at 1286; Independence HMO, 733 F. Supp. at 983; DeGenova, 555 A.2d at 147.
354. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (11. 1965);
Strubhart v. Perry Mem'l Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995).
355. Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 415 (N.J. 1995); McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org.,
660 A.2d 97, 99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
356. Dunn, 656 A.2d at 415; McClellan, 660 A.2d at 99.
357. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1966).
358. Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979); Bush v.
Dake, File No. 86-25767 NM-2 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Saginaw County 1989), reprinted in FURROW Er
AL., CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 187, at 719-22. '
359. See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. App. Ct. 1990);
Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. App. Ct. 1986); Dunn, 656 A.2d at 415; Williams v.
HealthAmerica, 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
360. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431 & 439 (1965).
361. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
362. See Bronow, supra note 27, at 11; Mehlman, supra note 26, at 299-306; authority cited
supra notes 178 and 198.
363. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 442(a), 442(c), 442A, 442B, 443, 447, 447(c)
(1965).
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failure to use reasonable care in treatment decisions is also foreseeable when the
HMO, after utilization review, negligently denies the prescribed treatment.
Imposing corporate liability upon HMOs will not increase litigation.
Physicians will continue to be exposed to liability, regardless of whether courts
impose corporate negligence upon HMOs. However, what imposing corporate
negligence on HMOs will do is to shift the burden, or a portion of the burden,
of tort liabilty onto the shoulders of the HMO rather than leaving the burden
solely to physicians. The issue really comes down to the question of who should
bear the loss because the cost is already reflected in the price of individual
treatment.
Shifting liability, or at least a portion of it, would seem appropriate for at
least three reasons. First, HMOs, in their unique structure and arrangements,
save money. But, when this structure results in substandard care, HMOs as
institutions should appropriately bear the burden of liability for the resulting
injuries, not just the treating physicians who are restricted in their medical
judgment by the cost-containment incentives and the prospective utilization
review process created by HMOs. Second, making individual physicians bear
the bulk of liability exposure exacts many societal costs. Physicians react with
bitterness and anger to the prospect of being defendants,' and the fear of
personal liability arguably leads to the practice of defensive medicine.3"
364. Id.
365. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 334 (citing F. Patrick Hubbard, The
Physician's Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the
Symbolic Importance of "Tort Reform, " 23 GA. L. REv. 295 (1989)); FURROW Er AL., CASES &
MATERIALS, supra note 187, at 162-63.
366. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 537 (citing PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL
MALPRACICE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 225-27 (1985)); A.G. Lawthers,
Physicians' Perceptions of the Risk ofBeing Sued, 17 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 463 (1992); Paul
C. Weiler et al., Proposal for Medical Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2355, 2356 (1992). Defensive
medicine has been defined as "those medical practices that are not medically justified and are
performed primarily to prevent or defend against the threat of liability." David Klingman et al.,
Measuring Defensive Medicine Using Clinical Scenario Surveys, 21 J. HEALTH POLS., POL'Y & L.
185, 187 (1996) (emphasis added). From the standpoint of patient health concerns, "good" and
"bad" types of defensive medicine exist. "Good" defensive medicine "avoids adverse outcomes,"
contributes to the goal of avoiding risks of injuries to patients, and "might increase or decrease
health care costs." Id. "Bad" defensive medicine encourages "physicians to order tests or
procedures that both raise health care costs and pose a risk of injury to patients." Id. The American
Medical Association estimated that defensive medicine added approximately $12 billion to health care
cost in America in 1985. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 352 (citing Martin
Hatlie, Professional Liability: The Case for Federal Reform, 263 JAMA 584 (1990)). If true, the
figure could be over $20 billion today. Id. However, this figure did not distinguish between
"good" and "bad" defensive medicine. Moreover, one recent study suggests that the practice of
defensive medicine does not exist to the extent previously suggested and that "[i]n most cases,
medical indication, not malpractice concerns, motivated clinical choices." Klingman, supra, at 185.
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While nearly all major tort litigation targets institutions, and not individuals,
medical malpractice litigation uniquely targets individual physicians as the
defendants, resulting in non-monetary societal costs. By shifting the focus onto
the HMOs as institutional defendants, medical negligence litigation would fall
in line with other major tort litigation and perhaps avoid the non-tangible impact
of litigation on individual health care providers. Third, imposing corporate
liability on HMOs would only require that they use reasonable care in managing
their businesses. Nothing more. Nothing less. Other businesses, such as
hospitals, airlines, railroads, construction companies, taverns, florists, and
bakeries, must use reasonable care in operating their respective enterprises.
Justice would seem to dictate that HMOs also be held to the same standard of
reasonable care in the management of their business.
However, the major roadblock to the corporate liability of HMOs is ERISA
preemption which courts have generally held to preclude corporate liability of
employer-sponsored HMOs. 7 Courts are more likely to conclude that claims
The misperception, which has no rational basis, that the poor are more likely to bring malpractice
suits has purportedly resulted in the unwillingness of physicians to treat lower income and Medicaid
patients. FuRRow Er AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 353 (citing Helen R. Burstin et al., Do
the Poor Sue More? A Case-Control Study of Malpractice Claims and Socioeconomic Status, 270
JAMA 1697 (1993)); Karen H. Rothenberg, Myth and Reality: The Threat of Medical Malpractice
Claims by Low Income Women, 20 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 403 (1992). Surprisingly,
personal malpractice experience does not clearly cause the practice of defensive medicine. One
study concluded that "[p ]ersonal malpractice experience is not a predominant factor.., that piompts
physicians to engage in defensive practices, to the extent that such practices exist." Peter A.
Glassman et al., Physicians' Personal Malpractice Experiences Are Not Related to Defensive Clinical
Practices, 21 J. HEALTH CARE POL'Y & L. 219, 220 (1996). Furthermore, it has been suggested
that defensive medicine might well be needed to provide quality care under managed care health care
systems:
For all its problems, the medical malpractice system is designed to hold the medical
profession to an acceptable level of quality by deterring negligence. Whether the
current malpractice system is effective in achieving this objective is a matter of debate.
... Nevertheless, given new incentives to do less rather than more in a "reformed"
health care system, major reforms of the medical malpractice system that reduce or
remove incentives for physicians to practice defensively could reduce or remove a
deterrent to providing too little care when such mechanisms are most needed.
Klingman, supra, at 204.
367. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996);
Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc., v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Tolton v. American
Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir.
1993); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993);
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F.
Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995); Chaghervand v. Carefirst, 909 F. Supp. 304 (D. Md. 1995); Dearmas
v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Burke v. Smithkline Bio-Science Lab., 858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Stroker v. Rubin, Civ.A. No. 94-5563, 1994 WL 719694 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1994); Elsesser
v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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alleging corporate liability "relate to" the administration of benefit plans and
accordingly are subject to ERISA preemption.316  The Supreme Court369 or
Congress370 needs to resolve the issue whether ERISA preempts causes of
action alleging corporate liability against HMOs and to clarify whether HMOs
may permissibly be held liable under the time-honored principles of vicarious
liability.
368. See, e.g., Burrage, 59 F.3d at 154; Tolton, 48 F.3d at 941-42; Spain, 11 F.3d at 131;
Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 298; Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321.
369. See generally Pittman, supra note 8.
370. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338-39.
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